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1 Introduction
Local governments in the United States are estimated to spend 80 billion dollars per
year on incentives to attract or retain companies (Story 2012).1 Local governments
in developing countries, especially Brazil, India, and China, also extensively compete
for ﬁrms through oﬀering ﬁscal incentives. While local governments in Europe are
currently limited in their power to oﬀer these incentives, this issue has recently arisen
in the courts (Markusen and Nesse 2007). Given the large costs and prevalence of
these policies around the world, understanding their economic impact is crucial.
The local policy eﬀects depend on whether the policy meaningfully stimulates
labor demand, directly aﬀects worker productivity, or yields local spillovers to other
industries. The policy eﬀects also depend on how the economy adjusts to the shock.
For example, the impact will be aﬀected by whether and how quickly individuals
migrate in response (Bartik 1991; Blanchard and Katz 1992). Importantly, the local,
long-run impact also depends on whether companies remain in their new jurisdiction
or eventually leave for another jurisdiction oﬀering a more attractive package. This is
one potentially important distinction between local governments individually oﬀering
incentives and a central government oﬀering incentives to locate in a particular region
(for example, federal Empowerment Zones in the United States or Regional Selective
Assistance [RSA] in Great Britain).2
These factors aﬀecting the policy impact may vary by industry. Industries pay
diﬀerent wages and employ people with diﬀerent characteristics, including diﬀerent
mobility frictions. Spillover eﬀects may also depend on which industry was targeted.
Thus, the impact of a policy attracting a manufacturing ﬁrm may be quite diﬀerent
from that of a policy attracting a ﬁnancial services company.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, I study the short-run impact
of a well-known policy seeking to create an international center for ﬁnancial services
in one jurisdiction. While previous papers have studied shocks to manufacturing and
energy,3 there is a particular lack of evidence on policies attracting white-collar jobs,
and no papers to my knowledge studying policies targeting ﬁnancial services. These
1Carruthers and Lamoreaux (2014) survey the literature on regulatory races.
2Devereux, Griﬃth, and Simpson (2007) and Criscuolo et al. (2012) analyze the RSA policy.
Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) study Empowerment Zones. See Neumark and Simpson (2015)
for a review of studies analyzing place-based policies.
3This literature is reviewed at the end of the section.
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are an important target for local jurisdictions. Reﬂecting this importance, Prudential
Financial and Royal Bank of Scotland each received more than 100 million dollars in
state grants from 2007 to 2012 (Story, Fehr, and Watkins 2012).4
I present estimates, the ﬁrst of which I am aware, of local multiplier eﬀects from a
nontradable sector to other nontradable sectors, and more speciﬁcally from ﬁnance to
other nontradable sectors. I then compare these magnitudes to recent estimates of lo-
cal multiplier eﬀects from tradable to nontradable sectors (Moretti 2010; Moretti and
Wilson 2013).5 These comparisons are relevant for local policymakers deciding which
sectors to target. By focusing on a shock to ﬁnancial services, the results uniquely
contribute to policy and academic discussion of how the ﬁnance sector beneﬁts society
(Zingales 2015). I also apply the relatively new, though increasingly used, synthetic
control method to the local labor-market literature.
Second, I study a unique setting in which a short-run policy-induced advantage
weakens over time. Given signiﬁcant competition between jurisdictions, it is necessary
to understand the robustness of local policies to future competition. If ﬁrms remain
in the jurisdiction even after the jurisdiction's policy-induced advantage disappears,
this may suggest agglomerative eﬀects or high ﬁxed costs of relocation.
I study the dynamic eﬀects of an exogenous increase in local labor demand aﬀect-
ing the ﬁnance sectoran increase resulting from a landmark United States Supreme
Court decision. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Marquette National Bank
of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp. that a bank could export the high-
est interest rate allowed by the state in which it is headquartered. Previously, state
usury laws determined the maximum interest rate that banks could charge customers
residing in that state (regardless of where the bank was headquartered).
Marquette implied that if one state eliminated its usury laws, banks could relo-
cate to that state and charge unlimited interest to customers around the country.
South Dakota eliminated its usury laws in 1980. Delaware followed in 1981 with the
Financial Center Development Act (FCDA), which also introduced a regressive tax
for banks. Likely because of its proximity to New York and its regressive tax, many
4Based on these data, Prudential Financial was awarded $224 million in state grants from 2007
to 2012, and Royal Bank of Scotland was awarded $121 million. Out of 48 companies identiﬁed as
having received more than $100 million dollars in state grants from 2007 to 2012, Prudential was
ranked eleventh and Royal Bank of Scotland thirty-ninth (Story, Fehr, and Watkins 2012).
5As in Moretti (2010), I use tradable employment to refer to manufacturing and nontradable to
refer to other industries, excluding agriculture, mining, government, and the military.
3
more banks and credit card companies opened subsidiaries in Delaware than in South
Dakota.
Within just a few years, other statesincluding Delaware's neighborsresponded
with similar policies eliminating or increasing the limit on interest rates. As more
states with low taxes passed these policies, Delaware's tax advantage weakened too.
Within 10 years of Delaware enacting its policy, the original policy-induced advantage
was eliminated.
The Marquette decision eﬀectively deregulated the bank credit-card market in the
United States. Given its importance, an existing literature studies its impact on
credit-card interest rates, proﬁts, consumer ﬁnance, and entrepreneurship (Ausubel
1991; Chatterji and Seamans 2012; Knittel and Stango 2003; Zinman 2003). Sim-
ilarly, Delaware's legislative action is well known for its impact on bank relocation
(Evans and Schmalensee 2005). However, this is among the ﬁrst papers to study
the exogenous increase in local labor demand following Marquette, which created an
important center for ﬁnancial services in Delaware.6
The ideal estimate of the policy's treatment eﬀect would compare outcomes
in Delaware in year t to the outcome in Delaware in year t if the policy had not
been implemented. Because this control is not observed, I use the states bordering
Delaware as a counterfactual, as well as synthetic control methods. The latter create
a weighted composition of states that approximate what Delaware's economy would
have been had the policy not been implemented (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
2010, 2014). The relative value of these methods depends on whether prepolicy
predictor variables, or geographic proximities, are a better predictor of postpolicy
outcomes. Where these two methods diﬀer, they can be seen as informally bounding
the eﬀects.
I construct a data set from 1960 to 2013 using the Current Employment Statistics
(CES), Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS), the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) Index, CPS microdata, and various data from the U.S. census. Be-
cause the wage data are at the individual level, the synthetic control method employed
6Several earlier papers study the eﬀect of the FCDA (Butkiewicz and Latham [1991] and Abrams
and Butkiewicz [2007]). These papers ﬁnd positive eﬀects of the FCDA on Delaware's economy. I ex-
tend their study of the FCDA by focusing more on the economic adjustment mechanism, identifying
a control group to Delaware, using micro-level wage data, and testing for evidence of productivity ef-
fects, direct or indirect through agglomeration. Weinstein (2015) studies whether this sector-speciﬁc
increase in local labor demand aﬀects choice of college major.
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for the state-level data is not appropriate. Instead, I estimate regressions controlling
for state characteristics in the prepolicy period.
The policy had large eﬀects within the ﬁrst seven years. Total employment growth
increased approximately 1.5 percentage points per year relative to the controls in this
period, suggesting new jobs are not all ﬁlled by substitution across sector. Of this
increase, approximately 0.5 percentage points per year are due to Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate (FIRE); transportation/utilities and construction appear to have
grown also. There is an initial migration response; population growth is 0.6 percentage
points higher per year than in the synthetic control. The unemployment rate falls by
an average of 2.3 percentage points below the synthetic control, and the participation
rate increases by an average of 1.3 percentage points relative to the controls. I cannot
rule out that this is partly driven by workers leaving unemployment or reentering the
labor force. While wages are not higher in this ﬁrst period, there is a one-year wage
eﬀect, consistent with increases in labor supply.
By the end of the ﬁrst postpolicy decade, these eﬀects persisted at similar mag-
nitudes, and the eﬀects on population growth and participation rate were larger. By
1992, each FIRE job created from 1980 to 1987 is associated with an additional three
jobs in FIRE (from 1987 to 1992), trade, transportation/utilities, and construction.
Delaware wages are 8 percent higher than in other states, whereas just before the
policy they were equivalent, controlling for covariates. In the banking and credit in-
dustry, Delaware wages are now 7 percent higher than in other states, whereas before
the policy they were 7 percent lower.
Evaluating the policy's long-run impact requires the stronger assumption that
any long-run diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence derives from the initial shock. With this caveat,
the results suggest Delaware's original advantage provided long-run eﬀects, even af-
ter other states had competed it away. Ten to twenty years after the policy, when
Delaware's policy-induced advantage had arguably disappeared, the policy's eﬀects
strongly persist. Local multipliers suggest that for every FIRE job created from 1980
to 1987, by 2000 there were an additional 6.8 jobs in FIRE (from 1987 to 2000),
trade, transportation/utilities, and construction. Excluding the spillover FIRE jobs,
this multiplier is 4.1.
Twenty to thirty years after the policy, total employment growth appears to have
slowed. However, the lower unemployment rate, higher population growth, and higher
wages persist even 30 years after the policy, though with some convergence toward
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the control. This persistence diﬀers dramatically from that found in Blanchard and
Katz (1992).
I test whether these long-run eﬀects on the unemployment rate are explained
by the increased share of workers employed in ﬁnance, a sector with higher wages
and lower unemployment. This is also an informal test of whether agglomerative
eﬀects in Delaware are stronger than in ﬁnance nationally. Speciﬁcally, I compare
the unemployment rate in Delaware to the predicted unemployment rate based on
national sectoral unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
By approximately 15 years after the shock, I ﬁnd that the persistent eﬀect on the
unemployment rate is almost all explained by the shift in sectoral composition. This
suggests that while the policy had positive eﬀects in Delaware, it was ineﬃcient on
the aggregate level.
The eﬀects of this local ﬁnancial services shock diﬀer from the eﬀects of policies
not speciﬁcally targeting white-collar industries.7 First, the local multipliers from
ﬁnance to nontradable employment are larger than recent estimates from tradable
to nontradable employment (Moretti 2010), though smaller than the very short-run
local multiplier from biotech to nontradable employment (Moretti and Wilson 2013).
Second, the migration response is larger and more signiﬁcant than two other im-
portant local development policies: 1) the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) tar-
geting manufacturing and agriculture (Kline and Moretti 2014) and 2) federal urban
Empowerment Zones (EZs), which did not target speciﬁc industries (Busso, Gregory,
and Kline 2013). This is consistent with higher education levels of ﬁnance employees,
which causes higher geographically mobility (Malamud and Wozniak 2012). Changes
in the number and types of workers in the jurisdiction have important implications
for incidence of the policy, but also for the industries that may experience spillovers.
Third, the ﬁnance shock's eﬀects in Delaware appear more robust than those of the
TVA to a weakening policy-induced advantage, though the time series for the TVA
study is considerably longer (40 years after a weakened advantage relative to 20).8
This may suggest stronger agglomeration economies from ﬁnance, or it may suggest
7A related literature studies whether temporary, local shocks can have long-run eﬀects (Carring-
ton 1996; Davis and Weinstein 2002, 2008; Hanlon 2015; Miguel and Roland 2011; Redding, Sturm,
and Wolf 2011).
8After federal subsidies decreased, TVA regions experienced no population growth, reversal in
agriculture employment growth, and positive though much reduced growth in manufacturing (with
smaller magnitudes than the continued ﬁnance growth in Delaware) (Kline and Moretti 2014).
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larger moving costs for ﬁnance ﬁrms. Alternatively, this could simply reﬂect the value
of targeting an industry that performs well in the long run, and manufacturing did
not. Finally, the wage eﬀects in Delaware also contrast with lack of wage growth from
the TVA, though there are wage eﬀects from EZs.
The results have important policy implications: local policies can successfully
incentivize ﬁrms to relocate, producing signiﬁcant local wage and employment eﬀects,
and these eﬀects can be sustained in the longer run. However, this is conditional on
the policy shifting the economy's composition toward sectors with low unemployment
and high wages in the long run. It is especially notable that this shift was lasting in
Delaware, despite other states later passing similar legislation.
2 Exogenous Shift in Labor Demand in Delaware: A
Temporary Policy-Induced Advantage
Prior to 1978, state usury laws determined the interest rate that credit card companies
could charge residents of the state.9 The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Marquette
allowed a bank to export the highest interest rate allowed by the state in which it is
headquartered. At the time, large banks claimed losses in their credit card divisions
because of high interest rates, coupled with ceilings on the interest rates they could
charge. After Marquette, banks were eager to ﬁnd a state that would allow them to
charge higher interest rates nationwide.
In 1980, South Dakota eliminated its usury laws, and Citibank subsequently moved
its credit card operations to South Dakota. Delaware, which had historically provided
a favorable business climate, was looking to diversify its economy from the automotive
and chemical industries.10 After Marquette, the state recognized the opportunity to
attract the ﬁnance industry. In 1981, Delaware eliminated its usury laws by passing
the FCDA. In addition to eliminating ceilings on interest rates for most kinds of
loans, the FCDA reduced other industry regulation and introduced a regressive tax
structure for banks.11
9The description of the FCDA in this section is based on Moulton (1983).
10Delaware was historically a favored location for business incorporation, due to its corporation
law, Court of Chancery (corporations court), and a traditionally business-friendly government (Black
2007).
11There were capitalization and employment requirements for these FCDA banks. In the sub-
sequent years, Delaware passed two other pieces of legislation aimed at helping smaller banks and
7
While South Dakota was the ﬁrst to eliminate its usury laws, Delaware was closer
to the major ﬁnancial centers of the Northeast. In addition, unlike Delaware, South
Dakota did not introduce a regressive tax structure for banks until 1991 (South Dakota
Session Laws 1979, 1991).12 As a result, many companies moved their ﬁnance or credit
operations to Delaware, starting with J.P. Morgan in 1981. By 1987, 27 banks and
nonbanks had been opened or been acquired through the FCDA (Figure 1, Panel
A).13 Eighteen were focused in part on consumer credit and credit/debit cards, while
the remainder generally focused on wholesale banking. Of the 27 banks, 12 were from
New York, and these were focused generally on wholesale banking rather than credit
cards. By 1987, four banks had moved from Pennsylvania, four from Maryland, and
three from Illinois. Figure 2 shows that around the time of the policy there were clear
increases in the share of Delaware's employment in FIRE.
The tax and interest-rate advantages the FCDA conferred upon Delaware were
ultimately only temporary. After the policy, Delaware remained an attractive place to
relocate for banks from New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, despite these states
responding with similar legislation. The taxes on banks remained lower in Delaware,
and the interest-rate ceiling higher when compared to Maryland or Pennsylvania.14
However, after Delaware's legislation, many other states responded similarly by elim-
inating interest-rate ceilings, and also oﬀered low taxes on ﬁnancial institutions. By
international banks to take advantage of the FCDA provisions. These had smaller initial impacts
than the FCDA (Erdevig 1988). The eﬀects in this paper can be seen as the combined eﬀects of the
FCDA and these additional laws extending the FCDA provisions. Other provisions of the FCDA
include allowing borrowers and lenders to negotiate terms without interference from regulators, and
banks to charge certain fees for credit accounts.
12From 1979 until 1991, South Dakota imposed a tax of 6 percent on the net income of ﬁnancial
institutions (South Dakota Session Laws 1979). Delaware's tax was 8.7 percent on the ﬁrst $20
million of net income, 6.7 percent on net income from $20 to $25 million, 4.7 percent on net income
from $25 to $30 million, and 2.7 percent on net income over $30 million (Moulton 1983). In 1991,
South Dakota introduced a regressive tax on the net income of ﬁnancial institutions (South Dakota
Session Laws 1991).
13The source for the description of the banks and nonbanks opening through the FCDA through
1987 is Swayze and Ripsom (1988).
14See appendix for a full description of the resulting competition between states. New York
passed a law in 1981 eliminating its usury laws and allowing companies to charge fees, but did not
signiﬁcantly reduce its high taxes on banks (Rubin 2011). In 1983, Virginia eliminated interest-rate
ceilings on credit card loans, allowed unlimited annual fees, and invited out-of-state bank holding
companies to acquire a bank. By 1983, Maryland raised but did not eliminate the interest-rate ceiling
and allowed credit card fees, but the bank tax rate of 7 percent was not changed (Maryland Session
Laws 1968; Michie's Annotated Code 2004). In 1982, Pennsylvania raised but did not eliminate the
interest-rate ceiling, allowed some bank fees (Erdevig 1988), and reduced taxes on banks, though
they were not lower than in Delaware (Pennsyvlania Department of Revenue 2008, 2015).
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1982, most states with large banking sectors had relaxed or repealed their interest-
rate ceilings (Ausubel 1981). By 1985, 15 states had eliminated the ceiling on credit
card interest rates (Chatterji and Seamans 2012).15
These changes implied that banks from New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania
now had many other options for relocation besides Delaware. In addition, the costs
of remaining in their own state were lower, given relaxation in interest-rate ceilings.
Most directly, Delaware's advantage had disappeared by 1991, when South Dakota
introduced a regressive tax rate for ﬁnancial institutions, with a lower top rate and a
lower bottom rate than Delaware (South Dakota Session Laws 1991). Consistent with
the policy advantage being only temporary, Figure 1, Panel B, shows that the number
of new banks remained relatively ﬂat in Delaware during the early 1990s, some 10
years after the policy went into eﬀect. Furthermore, starting in 1990, banks that had
moved to Delaware in the early 1980s began to leave the state. By the mid-1990s,
seven such banks had left.
This suggests that after 1991, banks and credit card companies that were relo-
cating or adding jobs in Delaware were not doing so because Delaware still oﬀered a
policy advantage. Thus, policy eﬀects 30 years after the policy's enactment can be
interpreted as long-run eﬀects of the policy, rather than continual short-run eﬀects
from a policy advantage. The erosion of Delaware's original advantage uniquely al-
lows me to study whether there are long-run beneﬁts to an initial advantage after
that policy-induced advantage has disappeared.
3 Data
I obtain annual data from 1960 through 2000 on nonfarm employment by state and
SIC industry from the BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES). Since the Stan-
dard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC)-basis estimates are only available until 2001, to
obtain a longer time series for total employment I use total employment from the
CES, North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) basis. These data are
15Some of these states may not have formally invited out-of-state bank holding companies as
Delaware had, implying that relocation there would be more diﬃcult. This also was changing
during the 1980s, and by 1990, 46 states allowed out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire
in-state banks in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the Riegle Neal Banking Act of 1994 implied
that this was no longer a necessary requirement (Medley 1994).
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available until 2013.16 When constructing shares of total employment by industry,
the denominator is total employment, SIC basis.17 From the BLS Local Area Un-
employment Statistics (LAUS), I obtain annual data from 1976 through 2013 on the
labor force participation and unemployment rate by state. I obtain state unemploy-
ment rates from 1970 through 1976, constructed from labor market areas.18 These
unemployment rates were normalized to equal the LAUS unemployment rate in 1976.
I obtain population by state and year from the intercensal estimates of the U.S.
census, available through 2010. The population numbers are the actual census pop-
ulation numbers in the census years. I obtain several demographic measures at the
state level from the pre-FCDA U.S. censuses in 1960, 1970, and 1980: percentage
with at least a high school diploma, percentage of the population aged 15 to 64, and
percentage living in metropolitan areas.
I obtain data on housing prices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency's All-
Transactions Index, which begins in 1975. I adjust the index using the Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). To analyze the eﬀect of the labor
demand increase on wages, I use individual level data from the 1950, 1960, 1970, and
1980 censuses and the 19772014 March Current Population Survey (CPS) microdata
(King et al. 2010; Ruggles et al. 2010). These data contain information on wages,
occupation, industry, geographic location, and individual demographics.
4 Empirical Methods
4.1 Dynamic Response of Employment-Related Variables
The treatment eﬀect of this policy in year t is YDE,t − Y NDE,t, where Y NDE,t is the
outcome in Delaware if the policy had not been implemented. Clearly, Y NDE,t is not
observed, but instead must be approximated by a control representing Delaware ab-
sent the policy. There are several possible ways in which to construct the control
group. Perhaps most obviously, I could estimate a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model
using bordering states as a control group. This strategy is appropriate if, absent the
policy, Delaware would not have experienced any diﬀerential shock in the postpolicy
16Unlike the NAICS-basis data for total employment, NAICS-basis data by industry are only
available starting in 1990.
17As a result, I measure employment by industry as a share of total nonfarm employment.
18These data were provided by Larry Katz, and were used in Blanchard and Katz (1992).
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years relative to these states. While this seems reasonable, it is not obvious that bor-
dering states are the best control, and the choice is somewhat arbitrary. In addition,
potentially negative policy eﬀects in bordering states would imply this strategy may
double count the policy's impact.
A second possibility is to use the data to identify states that appear similar before
the policy, using the synthetic control method (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmuller
2010, 2014). This method involves constructing a weighted combination of states
so that the outcome predictor variables match those in Delaware before the policy.
The assumption is that if the prepolicy trends appear similar in these states, their
postpolicy trends should have been similar in the absence of the policy.
I present results using both the bordering states and the synthetic control as a
counterfactual Delaware. While in many cases they yield similar results, there are
important dissimilarities, which I discuss. In cases where there are diﬀerences, the
two methods can be seen as informally bounding the eﬀects.
I analyze the response of several variables to this exogenous increase in labor
demand: employment growth (both total and by industry), unemployment rate, par-
ticipation rate, population growth, and housing price growth.
Synthetic Control
I construct a synthetic control with similar sectoral, economic, and demographic char-
acteristics as Delaware in the prepolicy period. Speciﬁcally, I include as predictors
ﬁve-year averages of the following variables in the prepolicy period: share of em-
ployment in construction, FIRE, manufacturing, trade, services, transportation and
utilities, and government, as well as the unemployment rate, labor force participation
rate, housing price growth, employment growth, and population growth.19 I also in-
clude as predictors the 1960, 1970, and 1980 census values for the percentage living
in metropolitan areas, percentage of the population 15 to 64, and percentage with at
least a high school diploma. By matching Delaware to a control with similar ﬁve-year
averages of these variables, often starting in 1960 and going through 1980, I capture
19I include ﬁve-year averages from 1960 through 1979, as well as the value in 1980 of the following
variables: share of employment in construction, FIRE, manufacturing, trade, services, transporta-
tion and utilities, and government. I include ﬁve-year averages from 1970 through 1979, and the
value in 1980 of the unemployment rate. I include ﬁve-year averages from 1961 through 1980 of
population growth and employment growth, and the average from 1976 through 1980 of labor force
over population.
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not only prepolicy levels but prepolicy trends.
By assigning equal weight to each of these predictors, I hold constant the compo-
sition of the synthetic control across outcomes. For robustness, I allow the weight on
the predictors to vary with each outcome, and I estimate a separate synthetic control
for each outcome variable. I include each state and Washington, D.C., as potential
components of the synthetic control.20 Robustness speciﬁcations address the concern
that the policy negatively aﬀected certain control states.
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Using Synthetic Control Estimates. Following
Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014), I obtain diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates by
comparing Delaware to the synthetic control in the period before the policy and in
each period after the policy. Speciﬁcally,
DDDE,t = (Outcome
DE
t −Outcomesyntht )− (OutcomeDEpre −Outcomesynthpre ). (1)
I deﬁne the preperiod as the ﬁve years immediately preceding the policy. For ease
of presentation, I divide years into the following groups: pre-1976, 19761980, 1981
1987, 19881992, 19932000, and post-2000. As will be evident, these groups were
chosen to match the diﬀerent stages of economic adjustment. Speciﬁcally, I estimate
DiffYDE,t = α0 + βgY earGroup_gt + ust. (2)
The variable DiffYDE,t is the diﬀerence in outcome Y between Delaware and
the synthetic control in year t. The variable Y earGroup_gt equals one if year t is
in year group g, and zero otherwise. The omitted year group consists of the years
immediately preceding the policy, 1976 through 1980.
Following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), I assess whether these ef-
fects are statistically signiﬁcant through the use of placebo tests. I estimate the
treatment eﬀects from assuming each of the states in the donor pool is the treated
state. For each state, I construct a synthetic control using the principal synthetic
control speciﬁcation.21 As in Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014), I obtain the
20I exclude Oregon since it is missing data in some prepolicy years.
21I do not allow Delaware to be in the synthetic control of the placebo treatment states, because
of the large policy eﬀects in Delaware.
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diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates for each of these placebo states. If the diﬀerences
between Delaware and the synthetic control are much larger than the diﬀerences be-
tween the other states and their synthetic controls, the results are less likely due
to chance alone. More formally, following Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014), the
placebo diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences can be interpreted as the sampling distribution for
the estimate DDDE,t. If the cumulative density function of all the diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimates is F (.), then the p-value of the one-tailed test that DDDE,t > 0
is 1− F (DDDE,t).
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Relative to Bordering States. I estimate the fol-
lowing speciﬁcation, including Delaware and bordering states (Maryland, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania):
Yst = α0 +
5∑
g=1
(βgY earGroup_gt + γgY earGroup_gt ∗DEs)
+δStateDEs + ust. (3)
4.2 Spillover Employment Eﬀects
Spillover employment eﬀects may operate with a lag. I compare sector-level employ-
ment growth over several multiyear periods in Delaware to that of the synthetic control
and compare these with prepolicy diﬀerences. For (t, t′) = (1980, 1976), (1987,1980),
(1992,1987), and (2000,1992), I estimate
DiffYt −DiffYt′ = α + β1987 + β1992 + β2000 + ut. (4)
The dependent variable DiffYt −DiffYt′ ≡
[Ln(EmplDE,t)− Ln(Emplsynth,t)]− [Ln(EmplDE,t′)− Ln(Emplsynth,t′)] .
There are four observations in the regression, and α denotes the diﬀerence in
sectoral growth between 1976 and 1980 in Delaware and the synthetic control. The
coeﬃcients βt measure the additional diﬀerence in sectoral growth between Delaware
and the synthetic control from t to t′ (i.e., β2000 gives the additional diﬀerence in
sectoral growth between Delaware and the synthetic control from 1992 to 2000).
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Given that there are three states in the control group when comparing it to bor-
dering states, I specify the regression slightly diﬀerently. However, this produces the
same diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence eﬀects as above. Speciﬁcally, I estimate the following for
state s and year t:
Ln(Emplst)− Ln(Emplst′) = α + γDE + β1987 + β1992 + β2000 +
δ1DE ∗ 1987 + δ2DE ∗ 1992 +
δ3DE ∗ 2000 + ust. (5)
4.3 Dynamic Response of Wages
I use the 1950 and 1960 1 percent sample, 1970 1 percent Form 1 state sample, and
1980 5 percent state sample, along with the CPS March Supplement microdata from
1977 through 2014, to determine the eﬀect of the labor demand shock on wages.
Because these data are at the individual level, I do not use the synthetic control
method. Instead, I control for state characteristics in the prepolicy period. I estimate
the following regression:
ln(wist) = α0 + γt + δDEist +
7∑
g=1
βgY earGroup_gt ∗DEist
+Xistκ+ Zsη + uist. (6)
The dependent variable is the log of the individual's wage and salary income from
the previous year, in 1999 dollars.22 The vector Xist contains individual character-
istics.23Zs is a vector of state characteristics in the prepolicy period, including the
value in 1980 as well as ﬁve-year averages from 1960 through 1964 and 1970 through
1974 of the following variables: share employed in FIRE, manufacturing, trade, and
services, as well as the unemployment rate and population growth.24 Because labor
22For data from the CPS March Supplement, I exclude individuals with wages below the ﬁrst
percentile of the nonzero wages in each year. In the census, the codes are the midpoints of intervals,
and so I do not employ the same restriction. Both the CPS and census data are top-coded.
23These include potential years of experience, potential years of experience squared, indicators for
grouping of usual hours worked per week last year and weeks worked last year, years of education,
and indicators for white, black, Asian, male, and married. See appendix for details on variable
construction.
24I do not include each of the ﬁve-year prepolicy averages because of the limited number of
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force participation rate is available only in 1976, I include the value in 1980 and the
average from 1976 through 1979. I include the same state-level demographic vari-
ables as in the synthetic control, and the mean of the outcome in each state in each
prepolicy year.25
The variable DEist indicates whether individual i living in state s in year t was
living in Delaware in that year. The year groups are similar to those above, but
adjusted by one year since respondents in the CPS report retrospective wages. I also
include as year groups the prepolicy census years 1960 and 1970, omitting an indicator
for 1950. I omit the interaction between DEist and 1950, since I include DEist. Thus,
I interact DEist with the year groups g, including 1960, 1970, 19771981, 19821989,
19901993, 19942001, and 20022014.
I also estimate a regression comparing wages in Delaware to wages in bordering
states:
ln(wist) = α0 + γt + δDEist +
7∑
g=1
βgY earGroup_gt ∗DEist
+Xistκ+ uist. (7)
Similar to the regressions in the earlier sections of this paper, I compare Delaware
to bordering states without controlling for other prepolicy state characteristics.
I estimate these speciﬁcations using the full sample (including industry and oc-
cupation ﬁxed eﬀects), and separately for individuals whose industry was Banking
individuals in the sample who are working in Delaware.
25Because these regressors are estimated with some error, they may induce measurement error
bias into the results. To determine if this could be problematic, I calculate a rough approximation of
the measurement error and the attenuation bias in the coeﬃcients. I regress the outcome (log wage)
in each prepolicy year on indicator variables for each state. Assuming classical measurement error, I
calculate the reliability measure on the prepolicy average wage as (1- var(SEs)var(meanincome_ts) ) for each t in
the prepolicy years. SEs denotes the robust standard error on the state indicator variable for state
s, and meanincome_ts is the average log income in state s in year t, for t = 1950, 1960, 1970, and
1977 through 1981. Because the banking and credit speciﬁcation only includes the mean wage in the
banking and credit sector for the year group 1977 through 1981, I estimate the reliability measure
for this year group as a whole. The reliability measures are all very high, greater than 0.9, with
a majority greater than 0.99. This suggests that the coeﬃcients suﬀer from very little attenuation
bias and should not greatly aﬀect the other coeﬃcients. These are rough approximations of the
reliability measures, given that when measurement error is present in multiple explanatory variables
(as may be the case here), it is not the variance of the mismeasured variable that aﬀects the plim
of the coeﬃcient, but the variance after netting out the other explanatory variables. Deriving the
inconsistency of the estimators in this case is more complicated (Wooldridge 2002).
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and credit agencies,26 as well as for Accountants and auditors,27 and for clerks and
managers who would be relevant to the banking and credit industries.28 Wages for
these occupations, regardless of industry, may have increased because of demand from
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
I include occupation ﬁxed eﬀects when only including those in the banking and
credit industry. I include occupation and industry ﬁxed eﬀects when the sample
is limited to relevant occupations. In the regressions limited to individuals in the
banking and credit industry, I only include the mean wage over the years 1977 through
1981, because of small sample sizes in early years.
The coeﬃcient βg measures the average diﬀerence in log wages for years in year
group g between an individual in Delaware and a similar individual working in a state
similar to Delaware before the policy (regression 6) or in a bordering state (regression
7). The ﬁrst year the policy may aﬀect wages is 1982, since respondents report the
previous year's wage. For each year group after 1982, I compare γ̂g to γ̂1977−1981; this
compares postpolicy diﬀerences to prepolicy diﬀerences. I estimate the regression
with standard errors clustered at the state level, state/year level, and unclustered
but robust to heteroskedasticity. To be conservative, I present the standard errors
when correcting only for heteroskedasticity, since these are larger than the clustered
standard errors.29
26Coded as 716 using the 1950 Census Bureau industrial classiﬁcation system.
27Coded as 0 using the 1950 Census Bureau occupational classiﬁcation system.
28I include the following 1950 Census Bureau occupation codes as clerks relevant in the banking
and credit industries: 310 (Bookkeepers), 321 (Collectors, bill and account), 341 (Oﬃce machine
operators), and 390 (Clerical and kindred workers [n.e.c.]). See Appendix Table A.12 in the on-line
appendix for the list of occupation codes included as managers relevant in banking and credit.
29While I report the largest standard errors, the F -tests for whether the eﬀects are equivalent to
the eﬀects in the years before the policy are also at times larger. This results in lower p-values.
When comparing to bordering states, and including all occupations and industries, the F -tests
comparing the eﬀects in 19942001 and 20022014 to 19771981 using the unclustered standard
errors imply that the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. However, they are not
statistically signiﬁcant based on the F -test using the standard errors clustered at the state/year
level. There is a similar result when comparing Delaware to bordering states and including relevant
clerks, accountants, and managers, and testing the equivalence of the eﬀects in 19942001 and 1977
1981. There is also a similar result when comparing Delaware to all states and including relevant
clerks, accountants, and managers, and testing the equivalence of the eﬀects in 19891993 and 1977
1981. This is because the covariances are higher in these instances when the standard errors are
unclustered but robust to heteroskedasticity than when they are clustered at the state/year level.
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5 Prepolicy Diﬀerences: Delaware, Bordering States,
and the Synthetic Control
Two of the top three states comprising the synthetic control are neighboring states
to Delaware (Maryland and Pennsylvania), accounting for approximately 36 percent
of the synthetic control (Table 1). The potential advantage of the synthetic control is
that it identiﬁes states similar to the treatment state, but not necessarily geographi-
cally close. Most of the other states in the control are those where manufacturing is
similarly important as it was in Delaware before the policy (27 percent of employment
in 1980). Other than Alaska, Florida, and Vermont (which make up only 16 percent
of the synthetic control), all of the nonbordering states in the synthetic control had
between 29 percent and 33 percent of their economy employed in manufacturing in
1980.30 American manufacturing experienced signiﬁcant declines in the 1980s. As
a result, states where manufacturing was similarly important may best approximate
Delaware in the absence of the policy.
Table 2 shows that in 19751979 manufacturing comprised 28 percent of Delaware's
employment, but only 24 percent of bordering states' employment. The synthetic
control more closely matches this high percentage in manufacturing, with 26 percent
employed in manufacturing. Similarly, in this period, services made up 17 percent of
Delaware's employment, but 19 percent of bordering states' employment. The syn-
thetic control more closely matches this lower percentage in services, with 17 percent
employed in that sector.
Figure 3 shows that for the main outcomes of interest, pretrends generally look
similar in the synthetic control and bordering states, and these fairly closely approx-
imate the prepolicy outcome in Delaware.
Thus, the principal advantage of the synthetic control over the bordering states is
greater similarity in the economy's sectoral composition: more reliance on manufac-
turing and less on services. Because of the important shock to manufacturing in the
1980s, comparing Delaware to other manufacturing states may be especially impor-
tant in satisfying the parallel trends assumption. However, if postpolicy trends are
driven mainly by geography rather than by these diﬀerences in sectoral composition,
30States with percentage employed in manufacturing: South Carolina (33 percent), Michigan (29
percent), North Carolina (34 percent), Indiana (31 percent), Connecticut (31 percent), Ohio (29
percent), Alaska (27 percent), Vermont (25 percent), and Florida (13 percent).
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then comparing Delaware to bordering states will more likely identify the policy's
causal eﬀect. As mentioned, where these methods yield diﬀerent results, they can be
seen as informally bounding the policy's eﬀect.
6 Adjustment to a Labor Demand Shock
6.1 Short-Run Adjustment
I focus ﬁrst on the policy's eﬀects over approximately the ﬁrst decade. This is a period
in which Delaware's policy-induced advantage over other states had not completely
disappeared. Also, because additional shocks are always possible in the long run,
attributing short-run eﬀects to the policy is more straightforward. Within this ﬁrst
decade, I analyze eﬀects within the ﬁrst seven years (through 1987), and then from
1988 to 1992.
Employment
Relative to before the policy, employment growth in Delaware immediately after the
policy is about 1.5 percentage points higher per year than in the synthetic control
(Figure 3; Table 3, column 1). This eﬀect is larger than all but two of the placebo
estimates, yielding a p-value of 0.06. While the magnitude is similar when comparing
Delaware to bordering states, the estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant. However,
Appendix Table A.3 shows that eﬀects on employment growth relative to bordering
states were large and statistically signiﬁcant in 1985 and 1987. The increase in em-
ployment growth suggests that the policy did not simply induce workers to substitute
across sectors, without an eﬀect on total employment.
Column 2 shows that of the 1.5 percentage point annual diﬀerence in employment
growth, 0.6 percentage points are due to FIRE employment growth. This FIRE
growth relative to the synthetic control is larger than all of the placebo estimates.
The magnitude is similar when comparing Delaware to bordering states.31 Delaware's
legislation required that banks opening as a result of the state's policy must employ
at least 100 people by the end of the ﬁrst year of operation. One way of measuring
spillovers within ﬁnance is to compare the number of new FIRE jobs with the number
31Appendix Table A.2 presents the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence for each postpolicy year, relative to the
ﬁve years immediately preceding the policy.
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of jobs required given the number of new ﬁrms. Twenty-one new banks had been
opened through the FCDA by 1987.32 Thus, between 1980 and 1987 there should
have been at least 2,100 new FIRE jobs in Delaware. In fact, there were 14,400 new
FIRE jobs in this period.33
Population growth increases immediately after enactment of the policy, suggesting
out-of-state residents are attracted to the newly created jobs. Relative to the prepol-
icy period, population growth is 0.6 percentage points higher per year in Delaware
compared to the synthetic control (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level) and 0.3 percent-
age points higher per year compared to bordering states (not statistically signiﬁcant)
(column 4). This migration is consistent with immediate increases in housing price
growth relative to the controls, although these eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant
(column 6). The results suggest population increases by an additional 1 percent for a
given 1 percent increase in FIRE jobs as a share of total employment in that year.34
There are large, immediate eﬀects on the unemployment and participation rate.
Relative to the period preceding the policy, Delaware's unemployment rate in the
ﬁrst postpolicy years is, on average, about 2.3 percentage points below that of the
synthetic control, a larger eﬀect than all but two of the placebo estimates. This eﬀect
is approximately 1 percentage point largerand more statistically signiﬁcantthan
the estimate using the bordering states. Similarly, compared to the prepolicy period,
the participation rate in Delaware immediately after the policy is, on average, about
1.3 percentage points higher than in the synthetic control and the bordering states,
and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
If the new residents in Delaware are moving directly into jobs, this would decrease
the unemployment rate and increase participation, without implying that the policy
helped individuals to leave unemployment or reenter the labor force. Immediately
after enactment of the policy, the growth rate of the number of unemployed and
people out of the labor force is more negative in Delaware than the synthetic control
32Figure 1 shows that 27 banks and nonbanks had been opened or acquired through the FCDA
by 1987. Of these, six had been acquired.
33While this includes new jobs in FIRE outside of banks and credit card companies (for example,
insurance and real estate), Erdevig (1988) reports 13,536 new jobs in Delaware commercial banks
from 1980 through 1987. Even including an additional 100 employees for the acquired banks (which
may not have faced the requirement if they already had 100 employees) implies many more jobs
were created than required.
34The coeﬃcients suggest the policy yields an additional 0.6 percent increase in FIRE jobs as a
share of employment, and an additional 0.6 percent increase in population.
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and bordering states, relative to before the policy (Appendix Figure A.5, Appendix
Table A.13). While these eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant, we cannot rule out
nontrivial eﬀects.
By the end of the 10-year period following enactment of Delaware's policy, total
employment growth in Delaware was still nearly 1 percentage point higher per year
than in the synthetic control and bordering states, relative to the prepolicy diﬀerence.
However, this is smaller and less statistically signiﬁcant than the immediate eﬀect.
FIRE employment growth remained large and statistically signiﬁcant, though also
smaller than the immediate eﬀect. The diﬀerence between columns (1) and (2) sug-
gests important employment spillovers to industries other than FIRE, as is discussed
below.
Similarly, by the end of the 10-year period following enactment of the policy, the
unemployment rate remained signiﬁcantly lower relative to the controls (2.2 percent-
age points relative to the synthetic control and 1.5 relative to bordering states), and
participation was signiﬁcantly higher (about 2.5 percentage points more than both
controls, relative to before the policy). Population growth was also much higher rel-
ative to the controls (roughly 1 percentage point per year more than both controls,
relative to the prepolicy period). Consistent with the population increase, housing
price growth was higher than in the controls, though only signiﬁcant relative to the
synthetic control.
In the years immediately following the policy, there are no statistically signiﬁcant
spillover eﬀects to other industries, though the eﬀects on transportation/utilities and
construction are quite large (Figure 6; Table 5). However, by the end of the 10-
year period following the policy, there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence suggesting
spillovers to trade and transportation/utilities. The coeﬃcients suggest that a 22
percent increase in FIRE jobs (and a 55 percent increase over the previous years) is
associated with an additional 7.6 percent growth in trade employment and an addi-
tional 11 percent growth in transportation and utilities employment. These eﬀects
are very similar when compared to bordering states, and the eﬀects on construction
employment are signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients in Panel A of Table 5 suggest the policy created an additional
12,680 FIRE jobs from 1980 to 1992, and that these jobs are associated with an
additional 1,474 transportation/utilities jobs and 5,396 retail/wholesale trade jobs.35
35This is based on Delaware employment in these industries in 1980 and 1987. In 1980 (1987)
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This suggests that for every 1 FIRE job created from the start of the policy through
1992, 0.54 jobs were created in trade and transportation/utilities.36 The coeﬃcients
relative to bordering states suggest an additional 11,626 FIRE jobs from 1980 to
1992, and these are associated with an additional 1,487 transportation/utilities jobs,
7,171 trade jobs, and 4,363 construction jobs. This multiplier is 1.12 (and 0.74 when
excluding construction).
Figure 1 suggests that by 1987, bank relocations to Delaware had nearly ended.
If I treat the additional FIRE jobs from 1987 to 1992 as spillovers rather than a
direct response to the policy, results suggest that for every FIRE job created from
1980 to 1987, by 1992 there were an additional 1.9 jobs in FIRE (from 1987 to
1992), transportation/utilities, and trade (1.02 excluding FIRE). The multiplier is
3.02 based on the bordering states speciﬁcation (including construction), and 2.13
excluding FIRE.
The multipliers suggest the ﬁnance shock in Delaware added a large number of
jobs in other sectors within the ﬁrst 10 years. Moretti (2010) estimates local multi-
pliers from tradable to nontradable employment. These multipliers are not directly
comparable given that I look at multipliers by sector rather than by all nontradable
jobs. However, the multipliers relative to added FIRE jobs from 1980 to 1987 are
larger than the general tradable-to-nontradable multiplier in Moretti (2010), though
smaller than the high-skilled tradable-to-nontradable multiplier (Moretti 2010). They
are also smaller than multipliers from biotech to nontradables (Moretti and Wilson
2013). The multipliers relative to added FIRE jobs from 1980 to 1992 are smaller
than these other estimates.
Interestingly, comparing Delaware to bordering states suggests eﬀects on manu-
facturing, though these are not evident when compared to the synthetic control. This
likely reﬂects the importance of comparing Delaware to other manufacturing states in
the synthetic control, rather than to bordering states where manufacturing was less
important.
there were 12,300 (26,700) FIRE jobs, 12,100 (13,400) transportation/utilities jobs, 56,000 (71,000)
trade jobs, and 14,700 (20,200) construction jobs.
36To construct the multipliers, I only include additional jobs that were statistically signiﬁcant in
Table 5.
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Wages
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence in wages after the policy (19821988) relative to just
before the policy (19771981), suggests a small, statistically insigniﬁcant policy eﬀect
on wages in Delaware (Table 4, column 1). This pre/post diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
is also small and statistically insigniﬁcant when comparing Delaware to bordering
states (Table 4, column 2) and when limiting the sample to individuals working
in banking and credit, or clerks, accountants, and managers (Table 4, columns 3
6). Including indicator variables for each postpolicy year interacted with Delaware,
there is evidence of a temporary increase in wages for all occupations and industries
one year after the policy (1983) that lasts for only one year (Appendix Table A.4),
consistent with Blanchard and Katz (1992). This is also consistent with increases in
labor supply. The eﬀect on population growth, without continued wage eﬀects in the
ﬁrst seven years, suggests that migration decisions are more strongly determined by
employment than by wages, as in Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2014).
By the end of the 10-year period following Delaware's policy, there are large,
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on wages. By 19891993, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
relative to just before the policy is 8 percentage points. This implies that Delaware
wages are now 8 percent higher than in other states, whereas just before the policy
they were equivalent, controlling for covariates. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence relative
to bordering states is also positive, though not statistically signiﬁcant. These eﬀects
were especially large among workers in the banking and credit industry. By 1989
1993, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence in banking and credit wages compared to just before
the policy is 14 percentage points relative to all states, and 10 percentage points
relative to bordering states. Among clerks, accountants, and managers, the eﬀects
are smaller and less statistically signiﬁcant, though still a nontrivial 4 percentage
points when compared to all states.
The results in this ﬁrst decade suggest that ﬁscal or regulatory competition can
eﬀectively incentivize employers to relocate. Importantly, these employment and wage
eﬀects are robust to attempts from other states to compete away the advantage, and
also robust to large population growth. The short-run eﬀect on population growth
diﬀers from place-based policies targeting other industries (Busso, Gregory, and Kline
2013; Kline and Moretti 2014). This may imply the policy is less beneﬁcial in helping
unemployed or out-of-the-labor-force workers in Delaware. However, it does cause
spillover eﬀects to other industrieseﬀects that appear larger than multipliers from
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tradable to nontradable employment (Moretti 2010), and there is some evidence of
reductions in the number of unemployed.
Given that ﬁrms continue to arrive in Delaware in this ﬁrst decade after policy
adoption, the exercise is not perfectly comparable to the Blanchard and Katz (1992)
study of adjustment to a one-time shock. However, similar to their ﬁndings, there is
an eﬀect on migration and not on ﬁrm exit. The next section will consider whether
the eﬀects within the ﬁrst decade can persist after Delaware has lost its policy-induced
advantage.
6.2 Long-Run Adjustment
By 1991, Delaware's tax and usury law advantage had disappeared because of compe-
tition from other states and federal legislation. This period provides a unique setting
to study the robustness of place-based policies to ﬁscal and regulatory competition
from other jurisdictions. If companies remain in Delaware, this may suggest that the
policy yielded agglomerative eﬀects. Alternatively, it may suggest small diﬀerences
in regulatory environments and substantial relocation costs for companies.
Analyzing the policy's long-run impact requires that any diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
must derive from the initial shock, ruling out alternative shocks in Delaware and
control states. Bordering states may be a better control in the long run, if long-run
economic trends are driven more by geography than by initial sectoral composition.
During the 1990s, total employment growth in Delaware remains about 1 percent-
age point higher per year than in the controls, relative to before the policy (Figure
3; Table 3). FIRE growth is contributing more to total employment growth than it
did immediately after the policy. Figure 3 shows a clear resurgence in FIRE growth
in this period. Figure 5 indicates that this appears to be mainly due to the growth
of MBNA, a credit card company that spun oﬀ from one of the original FCDA ﬁrms
relocating to Delaware.37 This suggests that persistent eﬀects are due to the original
policy, rather than a second shock aﬀecting ﬁnance labor demand in this period.38
37The insurance ﬁrm AIG also grew from 150 Delaware employees in the mid-1980s to 2,700
Delaware employees in 2001 (Epstein 2001b). This growth suggests the importance of agglomeration
economies. AIG located its marketing division in Delaware (Epstein 1999b). It pioneered the use of
direct marketing in the insurance industry (Jackson 1992), using strategies similar to those used by
Delaware's credit card companies. In the late 1990s, MBNA partnered with AIG to sell insurance
(Epstein 1999a), and AIG opened a bank (Epstein 1999b). Below, I test whether agglomerative
forces in Delaware appear stronger than in the industry nationally.
38Newspaper articles have attributed persistent eﬀects on Delaware's economy to the original 1981
23
The diﬀerence between columns (1) and (2) suggests important employment spillovers
to industries other than FIRE, discussed below.
From 1993 to 2000, Delaware's unemployment rate is 1.5 percentage points below
that of both the synthetic control and bordering states, relative to before the policy.
While this eﬀect represents convergence towards the synthetic control, it is similar in
size to the eﬀect in the 1980s and early 1990s when compared to bordering states.
This very incomplete convergence may be due to continued population growth in
Delaware, which is larger than all but two of the placebo estimates during this pe-
riod. Participation converges toward the controls during this period as well, though
remaining over 1 percentage point larger in Delaware than before the policy.39
The positive eﬀect on trade employment growth continues during the 1990s with
a similar or larger magnitude (though only signiﬁcant relative to bordering states)
(Table 5). The employment eﬀects in transportation and utilities are now smaller,
though they still imply that the policy increased employment in this sector by 7
percent. Eﬀects on construction employment growth are smaller than the preceding
period but still imply the policy increased employment in this sector by an additional
1216 percent (only signiﬁcant relative to bordering states).
To calculate the multiplier, I include the additional growth in each sector from
1980 to 2000, as well as the additional growth in FIRE from 1992 to 2000. As
Figure 1 shows, this FIRE growth is no longer due to new ﬁrms relocating as a direct
result of the 1981 policy, and so I interpret it as spillover eﬀects within FIRE. The
coeﬃcients from the bordering states speciﬁcation imply that the policy created an
additional 11,626 FIRE jobs from 1980 to 1992, and that these were associated with
an additional 11,218 FIRE jobs (from 1992 to 2000), 2,509 transportation/utilities
jobs, 15,474 trade jobs, and 7,162 construction jobs.
These results imply that for every FIRE job created from 1980 to 1992, by 2000
there were an additional 3.13 jobs in FIRE, transportation/utilities, trade, and con-
policy (Epstein 2001a). After extensively studying newspaper and trade journal articles, as well as
interviewing a knowledgeable party (chief of staﬀ and legal counsel to Governor du Pont, who signed
the FCDA into law), I found no evidence that this later growth at MBNA was the result of a second
Delaware policy. See the on-line appendix for information on an unsuccessful attempt to create
another regulatory advantage for Delaware banks.
39Participation drops below that of the synthetic control by the end of the sample period. Ap-
pendix Figure A.4 in the on-line appendix shows, based on CPS data, that in these years (2006 until
2010) there was also an increase in the percentage of new residents in Delaware who were 55 and
older. In 2014, Kiplinger ranked Delaware as the seventh most tax-friendly state for retirees, and
the tax-friendliest in the Northeast (10 Most 2014).
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struction relative to 1980. Not counting the FIRE jobs implies a multiplier of 2.16.
As before, the additional FIRE jobs from 1987 to 1992 are arguably the result of
within-FIRE spillovers. Accounting for this, the multiplier implies that for every
FIRE job created from 1980 to 1987, by 2000 there were an additional 6.83 jobs in
FIRE (from 1987 to 2000), transportation/utilities, trade, and construction relative
to 1980 (4.11 excluding FIRE). This is smaller than the short-run local multiplier
from biotech jobs (Moretti and Wilson 2013), but larger than recent estimates of the
local multiplier from tradable jobs to nontradable jobs (Moretti 2010).
With the caveat of having few prepolicy years, the positive eﬀect on housing price
growth falls considerably from the late 1980s to the mid-to-late 1990s. This may be
explained by new construction and a ﬂat long-run housing supply curve, consistent
with previous ﬁndings (Bartik 1991; Blanchard and Katz 1992). However, the eﬀect
increases again when compared to the synthetic control in the 2000s.
After 2000, there continues to be a negative policy eﬀect on the unemployment
rate (2 percentage points lower relative to the synthetic control, and 1 percentage
point lower relative to bordering states, but not statistically signiﬁcant). Population
growth also continues to be large and statistically signiﬁcant relative to the controls.
There is no longer any eﬀect on participation relative to either control.
Wages
The large eﬀect on wages persists in the 1990s. The coeﬃcient implies that Delaware
wages are now 6 percent higher than in other states, whereas just before the policy
they were equivalent, controlling for covariates. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence relative
to bordering states is also positive, suggesting wages are 2 percent higher in Delaware
in this period, whereas they were equivalent just before the policy. These eﬀects are
only slightly larger for workers in the banking and credit industry, whereas in the
earlier period they were considerably larger for these workers. In contrast, the eﬀect
on clerks, accountants, and managers is now larger than it was in the period from
1989 to 1993.
These large wage eﬀects also generally persist from 2002 to 2014, though magni-
tudes and statistical signiﬁcance are slightly smaller.
As noted in Blanchard and Katz (1992), migration decisions are based not on
nominal wages, but on consumption wages. Using the speciﬁcation with all occupa-
tions and industries, wages reported in 19891993 in Delaware are 8.2 percent higher
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than in similar states relative to their prepolicy levels in 19771981.40 Using the re-
sults from the synthetic control, Delaware housing prices become 18.2 percent more
expensive than in the synthetic control in 1988 (the relevant year for reported wages
in 1989), relative to their levels in 1980.41 Assuming a share of housing services of
15 percent, as in Blanchard and Katz (1992), and ignoring that other prices may
also go up, consumption wages increase by approximately 5.5 percent in 19891993.
Thus, while housing price growth dampens the incentive for individuals to migrate to
Delaware, this eﬀect does not eliminate the wage growth.
In sum, even after Delaware had lost its policy-induced advantage relative to other
states, the policy eﬀects strongly persisted for the next decade. Twenty to thirty
years after the policy, total employment growth appears to have slowed considerably.
However, the lower unemployment rate, higher population growth, and higher wages
persist even 30 years after the policy, though with some convergence toward the
control group. The results suggest Delaware's original advantage provided long-run
eﬀects, even after that advantage had disappeared.
Notably, the results diﬀer dramatically from Blanchard and Katz (1992), who ﬁnd
that unemployment and participation converge to the prepolicy equilibrium ﬁve to
seven years after the shock. Below, I consider the extent to which these long-run
eﬀects can be explained by the greater share of Delaware's economy employed in
ﬁnance, a sector with lower unemployment. An alternative explanation is that the
policy directly aﬀected worker productivity in the ﬁnance sector, or indirectly aﬀected
productivity through agglomeration.
Robustness
Predictor variables. The principal results estimate one synthetic control for each
outcome variable. However, Delaware's unemployment rate may have looked like
state X's in the absence of the policy, but the same may not be true of population
40Subject to the log approximation, the results suggest that controlling for covariates, reported
wages in Delaware are 3 percent lower than those in other states in 19771981. Reported wages are
5 percent higher in Delaware than other states in 19891993. I divide 1.05 by 0.97 to get the 8.2
percent diﬀerence in 19891993 relative to 19771981.
41Normalizing the value of housing in 1980 to 1.0 in Delaware and the synthetic control, I determine
the value in 1988, given the price growth in each year from 1981 through 1988. I obtain these values
from the principal synthetic control estimation. By 1988, the value was 1.3 in Delaware and 1.1 in
the synthetic control. The ratio of housing prices in Delaware to the synthetic control is the 1980
ratio multiplied by 1.3/1.1, or 118.2 percent.
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growth. For robustness, I allow for the synthetic control to diﬀer for each outcome
variable. Speciﬁcally, as described in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), for
each outcome variable, I ﬁnd the weights on the predictors that minimize the mean
squared prediction error of the outcome variable in the prepolicy period.
Overall, the composition of the synthetic control looks quite similar across outcome
variables (Appendix Table A.6). Several states make up a clear majority of the control
for most outcomes (Indiana, Connecticut, and Maryland). Relative to the main
synthetic control, there is signiﬁcantly more weight placed on Indiana and Connecticut
in this robustness control.
Allowing for the composition of the synthetic control to diﬀer for each dependent
variable yields some important diﬀerences in the control across outcomes. For ex-
ample, while Indiana comprises over 35 percent of the control for FIRE employment
growth, total employment growth, and the unemployment rate, it is only 9.5 percent
of the control for population growth and 0 percent of the control for participation. It
appears that relative to these other variables, population growth in Delaware looks
more similar to South Carolina and Ohio. Similarly, relative to these other variables,
participation in Delaware looks more similar to Arizona and Ohio.
The results are largely unchanged, though the eﬀect on population growth is
slightly smaller and less signiﬁcant (Appendix Figure A.2, Appendix Table A.8).
This suggests that while the synthetic control may change, it shifts to states that
look suﬃciently similar so that overall results do not dramatically change.
Adjusting for Negative Policy Eﬀects in Control States. The migration of
ﬁrms and people to Delaware will yield negative eﬀects in control states. If these
negative eﬀects are large in particular states, and those states are inﬂuential in the
synthetic control, then the policy's eﬀect will be overestimated. I will be double
counting the eﬀect of the policy in Delaware: comparing the positive eﬀect in Delaware
to the negative eﬀect in the control states.
Using data from the U.S. census, for each state I compare the fraction of the 1985
population that had moved to Delaware by 1990, and the fraction of the 1975 popu-
lation that had moved to Delaware by 1980.42 Looking at the diﬀerence in mobility
across these years allows me to infer the eﬀect of the policy on mobility. For robust-
ness, I estimate the synthetic control excluding the top ﬁve states losing population to
42State-to-state migration ﬂows are only available in the decennial years of the census.
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Delaware from 1985 to 1990, relative to 1975 to 1980. These include (with diﬀerence
in the fraction of population lost to Delaware in parentheses): Maryland (0.00043),
Pennsylvania (0.00039), New Jersey (0.00035), West Virginia (0.00025), and Rhode
Island (0.00023). While these states are important components of the synthetic con-
trol (Table 1), the population loss to Delaware is very small. This mitigates concerns
that negative policy eﬀects in control states bias the principal results. For example,
from 1975 to 1980, Maryland lost 0.28 percent of its population to Delaware (ap-
proximately 11,600 people). From 1985 to 1990, Maryland lost 0.32 percent of its
population to Delaware (approximately 14,200 people).
I construct the synthetic control but do not allow these ﬁve states to be in the syn-
thetic control for Delaware. I also exclude them from the placebo analysis. While the
composition of the synthetic control changes (Appendix Table A.9), the diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimates do not dramatically diﬀer from the principal results. However,
the eﬀects on unemployment and population growth are larger when excluding states
losing population to Delaware (Appendix Figure A.3, Appendix Table A.11). There
does not appear to be evidence that the principal results are overestimated, which is
not surprising given the small eﬀects on population in nearby states.
Compositional Eﬀects
The persistently lower unemployment rate and higher wages in Delaware may be
explained by the policy's impact on sectoral composition. The policy resulted in a shift
to ﬁnance, a sector with lower unemployment and higher wages. I compare Delaware's
actual unemployment rate to the predicted rate based on sectoral composition, using
national sectoral unemployment rates from the BLS labor force statistics (based on
the CPS). If Delaware's unemployment is lower than this predicted rate, this suggests
the policy brought sectoral unemployment rates (in ﬁnance or other sectors) lower
than the national rates. This could be due to the policy's direct eﬀect on worker
productivity in the ﬁnance sector, or to a potential agglomerative eﬀect of the policy.43
I obtain the predicted number of unemployed people by sector (s) in the following
way: URNational,s =
UDE,s
UDE,s+EDE,s
. The values of EDE,s (number employed in sector
s) and URNational,s (national unemployment rate in sector s) are known, and I solve
43As discussed in Evans and Schmalensee (2005), Marquette may have directly aﬀected worker
productivity in the ﬁnance sector because employees no longer had to tailor credit card oﬀers to the
customers' state of residence.
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for UDE,s (number unemployed in sector s). I then add the number of predicted
unemployed across all sectors, and divide by this number plus the total employed.44
The BLS started reporting sectoral unemployment rates in 1976, and so I present
predicted unemployment rates starting in 1976. The sectoral unemployment rates
use the SIC deﬁnitions, which are not available starting in the early 2000s, when the
BLS exclusively adopted the NAICS deﬁnitions. Consistent with the results presented
earlier, I present these predicted unemployment rates through 2000.
In the years immediately after the policy, there is a large diﬀerence between
Delaware's actual and predicted unemployment rates (Figure 7). The diﬀerence
reaches up to 2 percentage points in the mid- to late 1980s. Lower unemployment
rates than national averages are consistent with a dramatic, exogenous increase in
labor demand. During this initial period, there are transitions to employment from
unemployment and from being out of the labor force, and new residents arrive to
immediately take jobs. In this setting, we would expect that the unemployment rate
in Delaware is even lower than the new economic composition would suggest.
The actual rate remains considerably below the predicted rate until approximately
1994, nearly 15 years after the policy was enacted. This could be evidence of the pol-
icy's agglomerative eﬀects, which drive unemployment rates below national sectoral
rates in ﬁnance or other sectors.
During the mid-1990s, the unemployment rate is 1 to 2 percentage points lower
in Delaware than in bordering states and in the synthetic control. However, the
diﬀerence between Delaware's unemployment rate and the predicted rate based on
sectoral composition is signiﬁcantly smaller in this periodapproximately 0.2 per-
centage points. This suggests that much of the persistent eﬀect on the unemployment
rate in the longer run is due to the changed sectoral composition.
This exercise suggests the policy's long-run eﬀects are not due to its direct impact
on worker productivity in the ﬁnance sector. Rather, the results suggest the long-run
policy eﬀects can be attributed to the policy's impact on sectoral composition. While
this shift towards ﬁnance may have yielded agglomerative eﬀects in Delaware, the
results suggest these agglomerative eﬀects were not stronger than those that exist
in ﬁnance nationally. Delaware largely attracted ﬁrms from New York, an important
44The employment data used in the paper are only for nonfarm employment. However, the
state unemployment rate is constructed by the BLS using CPS data, which includes workers in the
agricultural sector. Thus, to compare the predicted unemployment rate to the actual rate, I use
data on agricultural employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
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ﬁnancial center with agglomerative eﬀects likely equal to at least the national average
in the industry. The results then suggest that while Delaware's policy yielded positive
eﬀects in Delaware, it was ineﬃcient at the aggregate level.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the short- and long-run impact of an exogenous shock to labor
demand in the ﬁnancial services sector, using the relocation of ﬁnance companies
to Delaware in the early 1980s. Policies aimed at attracting ﬁrms to a particular
jurisdiction are prevalent, though much of the recent literature has focused on policies
targeting jobs in the tradable sectorfor example, manufacturing. The response to
these policies may depend on the targeted industry because of diﬀerences in wages,
mobility frictions, and spillover eﬀects.
The ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to study the short-run impact of a policy
targeting ﬁnancial services, and to compare this to recent studies of policies targeting
the tradable sector. The second contribution is to study the long-run impact of the
policy, after the original policy-induced advantage had disappeared. Given intense
competition between local jurisdictions, it is important to understand whether newly
attracted ﬁrms will remain in the new jurisdiction or will leave for a more attractive
package.
Using bordering states, as well as the synthetic control framework, the ﬁndings
suggest that ﬁscal or regulatory competition can eﬀectively incentivize employers to
relocate, and that this has positive eﬀects on the local economy. By the end of the
ﬁrst decade, total employment growth, wages, population growth, and participation
were higher, while the unemployment rate was lower. Furthermore, for every FIRE
job created from 1980 to 1987, by 1992 there were up to three additional jobs in FIRE
(from 1987 to 1992), trade, transportation/utilities, and construction. These eﬀects
largely persisted for the two decades after Delaware lost its original policy-induced
advantage, with the exception of total employment growth in this latter decade. In
addition, by 2000 the multiplier was nearly seven.
These persistent eﬀects diﬀer dramatically from the Blanchard and Katz (1992)
ﬁnding that unemployment and participation adjust within ﬁve to seven years of the
shock. The policy's lasting impact on sectoral composition appears to explain these
persistent eﬀects. The lasting impact on sectoral composition is noteworthy given
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that other states passed similar legislation to that of Delaware in the following years.
The eﬀects diﬀer from recent studies of policies that do not speciﬁcally target
white-collar jobs. The principal diﬀerences are a stronger migration response to the
ﬁnance shock, and more persistent eﬀects after the original policy-induced advantage
disappeared. The multiplier eﬀects are larger than most estimates of local multipliers
from tradable to nontradable employment (Moretti 2010). One important exception is
that they are smaller than the estimated local multiplier from biotech to nontradable
emploment (Moretti and Wilson 2013).
The implication for policymakers is that short-run eﬀects from attracting ﬁrms can
be sustained if the policy shifts the economic composition toward a low-unemployment
and high-wage sector in the long run. However, at least in this setting, the successful
local policy appears ineﬃcient at the aggregate level. Agglomerative eﬀects do not
appear stronger than in the industry nationally.
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Figure 1: Bank Relocations Following Delaware’s Policy 
Panel A: FCDA Banks Opened/Acquired Through 1987, by Type and Origin 
 
Panel B: Banks Opening and Closing in Delaware, Through 2000 
 
Note: The source for Panel A is Swayze and Ripsom (1988). The source for Panel B is Epstein (2001a). There are slight 
differences because Panel A shows only FCDA banks and nonbanks, rather than all new banks (in particular leaving out 
Community Credit Bank Act banks created through 1983 Delaware legislation). Further, Panel A includes acquisitions, rather 
than only new banks that were opened.   
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Figure 2: Policy Impact on FIRE Employment in Delaware 
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Figure 3: Policy Effect on Employment, Unemployment, and Population: 
       Delaware Relative to the Synthetic Control and Bordering States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See paper for details on construction of the synthetic control.
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Figure 4: Policy Effects on Employment, Unemployment, and Population: 
                     Estimated Effects in Delaware Relative to Placebos
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See paper for details on construction of the synthetic control.
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Figure 5: Decomposition of FIRE Growth in Delaware, 1990s 
Panel A: FIRE Employment in Delaware, 1990-2015 
 
 
Panel B: FIRE Employment Growth Explained by MBNA Employment Growth 
 
Note: Panel A, and the left bar of Panel B are constructed using the CES, based on the NAICS industry 
codes.  The right bar of Panel B is constructed based on Boyer and Ratledge (2009). 
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Figure 6: Policy Effects on Employment Growth in FIRE and Other Industries: 
                    Delaware vs. Synthetic Control and Bordering States 
 
 
 
    
Note: See text for details on construction of the synthetic control.
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Figure 7:  Effect of Sectoral Composition on Delaware’s Unemployment Rate 
 
Note: The predicted unemployment rate is constructed using the share of Delaware’s employment in 
each sector from the CES, and national sectoral unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
See paper for details. 
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Table 1: Composition of Synthetic Control
Maryland 0.262
South Carolina 0.154
Pennsylvania 0.099
Michigan 0.091
North Carolina 0.084
Florida 0.082
Indiana 0.077
Vermont 0.057
Connecticut 0.044
Ohio 0.031
Alaska 0.02
Note: This table shows the composition of the synthetic control for Delaware. See paper for 
details.
Table 2: Pre‐policy Characteristics of Delaware, Bordering States, and the Synthetic Control
(1) (2) (3)
Predictors Delaware Bordering States Synthetic Control
Share Employed in
FIRE
1965‐1969 0.04 0.05 0.04
1970‐1974 0.05 0.05 0.05
1975‐1979 0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing
1965‐1969 0.36 0.32 0.33
1970‐1974 0.31 0.28 0.29
1975‐1979 0.28 0.24 0.26
Trade
1965‐1969 0.2 0.2 0.20
1970‐1974 0.21 0.21 0.21
1975‐1979 0.22 0.22 0.22
Services
1965‐1969 0.13 0.15 0.14
1970‐1974 0.15 0.17 0.16
1975‐1979 0.17 0.19 0.17
% Metropolitan
1960 68.9 81.5 56.5
1970 70.4 83.8 62.5
1980 67.0 87.4 73.6
% with ≥ a HS Diploma
1960 43.3 39.6 38.8
1970 54.6 51.7 49.6
1980 68.6 66.5 64.6
Unemployment Rate
1970‐1974 4.9 4.9 5.1
1975‐1979 8.0 7.5 7.0
1980 7.4 7.3 7.5
Population Growth
1966‐1970 0.02 0.01 0.01
1976‐1980 0 0 0.01
Note: This table compares the balance of predictor variables in the synthetic control, Delaware, and the states bordering 
Delaware.  Not all predictors are shown. For the full set of predictors, see text.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total 
Employment 
Growth
FIRE Employment 
Growth as a 
Share of 
Employment
Unemployment 
Rate
Population 
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing Price 
Growth
Panel A: Delaware Relative to Synthetic Control
Pre-1976 0.003 0 -0.823* 0.008*
(15/50) (26/50) (5/50) (4/50)
[.3] [.52] [.1] [.08]
1981-1987 0.015* 0.006** -2.3* 0.006* 0.013* 0.056
(3/50) (1/50) (3/50) (5/50) (5/50) (6/50)
[.06] [.02] [.06] [.1] [.1] [.12]
1988-1992 0.008 0.004** -2.224* 0.011** 0.025* 0.042*
(15/50) (1/50) (3/50) (2/50) (1/50) (5/50)
[.3] [.02] [.06] [.04] [.02] [.1]
1993-2000 0.01 0.006** -1.505* 0.011* 0.012 0.021
(6/50) (1/50) (3/50) (3/50) (13/50) (8/50)
[.12] [.02] [.06] [.06] [.26] [.16]
2001+ 0.006 -2.011** 0.011* 0.001 0.047**
(12/50) (1/50) (3/50) (26/50) (2/50)
[.24] [.02] [.06] [.52] [.04]
Panel B:  Delaware Relative to Bordering States
Pre-1976 0.004 0.001 -0.122 0.005*
(0.010) (0.001) (0.941) (0.003)
1981-1987 0.012 0.005*** -1.324 0.003 0.013 0.026
(0.012) (0.001) (0.940) (0.002) (0.011) (0.033)
1988-1992 0.010 0.004*** -1.553** 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.043
(0.013) (0.001) (0.756) (0.003) (0.010) (0.029)
1993-2000 0.007 0.005*** -1.467*** 0.007*** 0.018** 0.028
(0.007) (0.001) (0.491) (0.002) (0.009) (0.021)
2001+ -0.001 -1.008 0.007*** -0.000 0.027
(0.009) (0.695) (0.002) (0.009) (0.029)
Table 3: Policy Effects on Employment, Unemployment, and Population:
                           Differences-in-Differences Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The dependent variables are at the state/year level. Both panels 
present differences-in-differences estimates. Coefficients on year groups reflect the average difference-in-
difference for a given year in the year group. In Panel A, the rank of the effect relative to placebo estimates is 
in parentheses and the p-value based on this rank is in brackets.  In Panel B, robust standard error in 
parentheses.  Estimates in Panel B are the coefficients on year group interacted with Delaware.  See paper for 
details.
Delaware 0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 -0.17
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
DE*1960 0.03*** 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.24*** 0.21***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.23) (0.12) (0.13)
DE*1970 -0.003* 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.14
(0.04) (0.04) (0.23) (0.23) (0.13) (0.13)
DE*1977-1981 -0.03 0.002 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
DE*1982-1988 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.11 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
DE*1989-1993 0.05*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.05* 0.15* 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
DE*1994-2001 0.03*** 0.02** 0.005* -0.02 0.16*** 0.13*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
DE*2002-2014 0.02*** 0.01* 0.0008* -0.01 0.15*** 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12)
Control All Bordering All Bordering All Bordering
N 10,089,651 1,075,720 216,887 23,726 1,961,047 214,560
Table 4: Policy Effect on Wages: Delaware Relative to Observationally Similar and Bordering States
Note:  This table shows the coefficients on the interaction between Delaware and year group, relative to all 
states (Columns 1, 3, 5) and bordering states (Columns 2, 4, 6).  These coefficients are from a regression 
including an indicator for Delaware, each post-policy year, the year group 1977-1981, the earlier census years 
(omitting 1950), and the interactions listed in the table above.  The first two columns show the results for all 
occupations and industries, columns three and four show the results for individuals in the banking and credit 
industry, and the last two columns show the results for clerks, accountants, and managers relevant to the 
banking and credit industry.  Asterisks denote whether the interaction between Delaware and year group 
relative to the coefficient on Delaware*1977-1981 is statistically significant.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
In the regressions including all states, I control for state characteristics in the pre-policy period, individual 
characteristics, and occupation and/or industry fixed effects.  In the regressions including bordering states, I 
control for individual characteristics and occupation and/or industry fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses as these are larger than the clustered standard errors.  See text of the paper for further details.
Banking and Credit
Clerks, Accountants, 
ManagersAll
FIRE Trade
Transportation/
Utilties Services Construction Manufacturing Government
Panel A: Delaware Relative to Synthetic Control
1980-1987 0.549** 0.055 0.11 0.019 0.195 0.077 0.028
(1/50) (16/50) (10/50) (18/50) (8/50) (10/50) (16/50)
[.02] [.32] [.2] [.36] [.16] [.2] [.32]
1987-1992 0.222** 0.076* 0.11* -0.064 0.13 0.04 -0.035
(1/50) (5/50) (4/50) (42/50) (14/50) (15/50) (41/50)
[.02] [.1] [.08] [.84] [.28] [.3] [.82]
1992-2000 0.34** 0.103 0.067 -0.01 0.124 -0.119 0.067
(1/50) (7/50) (16/50) (26/50) (9/50) (45/50) (7/50)
[.02] [.14] [.32] [.52] [.18] [.9] [.14]
Panel B:  Delaware Relative to Bordering States
1980-1987 0.498*** 0.058 0.089 0.026 0.124 0.143*** 0.047
(0.052) (0.048) (0.087) (0.054) (0.105) (0.042) (0.069)
1987-1992 0.206*** 0.101** 0.111** -0.015 0.216* 0.083 -0.019
(0.014) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.107) (0.052) (0.054)
1992-2000 0.342*** 0.111*** 0.070** 0.040 0.159** -0.109** 0.085
(0.030) (0.020) (0.029) (0.038) (0.057) (0.045) (0.054)
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both panels present the additional employment growth in Delaware relative to 
the control over the given period relative to this difference in employment growth from 1976 to 1980. The dependent 
variables in Panel A are (Ln(Empl_t,DE) - Ln(Empl_t,synth)) - (Ln(Empl_t',DE) - Ln(Empl_t',synth)), for (t,t') = 
(1976,1980), (1980,1987), (1992,1987), (2000,1992).  The explanatory variables in Panel A are indicators for 1987, 
1992, and 2000 (with 1980 the left-out group). The dependent variables in Panel B are Ln(Empl_t,s) - Ln(Empl_t',s) and 
the explanatory variables include year fixed effects, and these effects interacted with Delaware.  In Panel A, the rank of 
the effect relative to placebo estimates is in parentheses and the p-value based on this rank is in brackets.  In Panel B, 
robust standard error in parentheses.  Estimates in Panel B are the coefficients on year group interacted with 
Delaware.  See paper for details.
Table 5: Policy Effect on Employment Growth in FIRE and Other Industries:
                           Differences-in-Differences Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy
Dynamic Responses to Labor Demand Shocks:
Evidence from the Financial Industry in Delaware
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Fiscal and Regulatory Competition from Other States
New York passed a law in 1981 eliminating its usury laws and allowing companies to
charge fees, but did not restructure the taxes. In fact, in 1981, there was a temporary
18 percent surchage on tax liability attributable to business in the Metropolitan Com-
muter Transportation District, later reduced to 17 percent in 1982. This surcharge
remains in place today. The tax rate in 1981 for banks was 12 percent, reduced to 9
percent in 1985, to 7.5 percent in 1999 (over three years), and to 7.1 percent in 2007
(Rubin 2011).
In 1983, Virginia eliminated interest rate ceilings on credit card loans, as well
as allowed unlimited annual fees and invited out-of-state bank holding companies to
acquire a bank. In 1982, Maryland raised the interest rate ceiling to 24 percent but
did not allow fees on credit cards or invite out-of-state banks until 1983. The tax on
ﬁnancial institutions in Maryland was 7 percent, both at the time of introduction in
1968 and at repeal in 2000 (Maryland Session Laws 1968, Michie's Annotated Code
2004).
While Pennsyvlania responded as well, it did not match Delaware's policy. In
1982, Pennsylvania raised the interest rate ceiling from 15 percent to 18 percent and
also allowed banks to charge a fee of up to $15 per year (Erdevig 1988). Pennsyvlania
taxes banks and ﬁnancial institutions based on their equity capital rather than on
their net income (as in Delaware and most other states) (Pennsyvlania Department
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of Revenue 2015). From 1971 through 1983, this tax rate was 1.5 percent. In 1984,
it was reduced to 1.075 percent, in 1990 it increased to 1.25 percent, and in 2014
it was reduced to 0.89 percent (Pennsylvania Department of Revenue 2008, 2015).
The eﬀective rate on net income was estimated to be 9.84 percent based on the 2014
rate, making it higher than the top rate in Delaware (Pennsyvlania Department of
Revenue 2015).
A Failed Attempt at Another Regulatory Advantage
The Bank and Trust Company Insurance Powers Act of 1989 allowed state-chartered
banks in Delaware to enter the insurance business and to exercise powers incidental to
banking (Nolen and Yemc 2011; Swayze and Schiltz 2005). Few other states allowed
such powers to banks (Schrader 1990). After the resolution of some policy, legal, and
regulatory uncertainty, several banks initiated insurance operations in Delaware in
the 1990s. However, a thorough review of newspaper articles and trade journals, as
well as a conversation with a corporate attorney involved with this policy, indicated
that the response was not large enough to explain the FIRE growth in the 1990s. At
its peak, Citicorp, which was one of the banks most interested in entering insurance,
had 200 employees in its insurance group in Delaware (Chuang 2000).
Construction of Variables
I calculate potential years of experience from the census and CPS asAge−Education−
6, and set this to zero if it is less than zero. I code education as 0 if the educ vari-
able from the CPS denoted that the respondent received no education, preschool, or
kindergarten (CPS code 2). I code education as 4 if the respondent attained grades
one through 4 (CPS code 10), six if the respondent attained grades 5 or 6 (CPS code
20), 8 if the respondent attained grades 7 or 8 (CPS code 30), and for grades 9 and
10 I code the education variable as the grade attained. I code the education variable
as 11 if the respondent attained 12th grade without a diploma (CPS code 71), and
12 if the respondent attained 12th grade with diploma unclear or diploma/equivalent
(CPS codes 72 and 73). I code the education variable as 13 for one year of college or
some college but no degree (CPS codes 80 and 81). I code the education variable as
14 for two years of college or associate's degree, occupational/vocational program, or
2
academic program (CPS codes 90, 91, and 92). I code the education variable as 15
for three years of college, 16 for four years of college or bachelor's degree (CPS codes
110 and 111), and 18 for anything more than four years of college (CPS codes 120
through 125).
The education codes for the census are slightly diﬀerent. I code the education
variable as 4 if the individual attained nursery school to grade 4 (census code 1); 8
if grades 5, 6, 7, or 8 (census code 2); for grades 9 through 12 I code the education
variable as the grade attained. I code the education variable as 13 for one year of
college; 14 for two years of college; 15 for three years of college; 16 for four years of
college; and 17 for ﬁve or more years of college (census code 11).
I code as married those who respond that they are married with spouse absent in
addition to those who are married with spouse present.
I code groupings of hours and weeks worked in the CPS to be consistent with the
census variable. I include indicators for the following groups of usual hours worked
per week last year: 1 through 14 hours, 15 through 29 hours, 30 through 34 hours, 35
through 39 hours, 40 hours, 41 through 49 hours, 49 through 59 hours, and 60 hours.
I include indicators for the following groups of weeks worked last year: 1 through 13,
14 through 26; 27 through 39; 40 through 47; 48 through 49; 50 through 52.
Policy Impact on Sectoral Composition
Appendix Figure A.1 shows the policy's eﬀect on sectoral composition, and Appendix
Table A.14 presents diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates. The ﬁrst plot in Appendix
Figure A.1 shows the dramatic increase in the share employed in FIRE. Before the pol-
icy, approximately 5 percent of nonfarm employment in Delaware, bordering states,
and the synthetic control was employed in FIRE. Immediately after the policy, the
percentage employed in FIRE grew dramatically in Delaware, reaching 12 percent
by 2000. The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, and ap-
proximately the same magnitude using both the synthetic control and the bordering
states (Appendix Table A.14). In the postpolicy years, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
using the synthetic control are larger than all of the placebo estimates.
Trade, and transportation and utilities became a smaller share of employment
in Delaware relative to both the synthetic control and the bordering states. These
eﬀects began immediately after the policy and persisted for the next twenty years.
3
The magnitudes are fairly similar using both control groups, though the synthetic
control implies a more negative eﬀect on the share employed in trade in 19932000.
The eﬀect on the share employed in services is one of the most striking diﬀerences
between the estimates using the synthetic control and the bordering states. While
there is no eﬀect relative to the synthetic control, the results suggest a negative
policy eﬀect in Delaware relative to the bordering states (especially in later years).
Finally, there is some evidence the policy immediately increased the share employed
in construction, which is not captured in Appendix Table A.14 because it was only a
short-term eﬀect.
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Appendix Figure A.1: Policy Effects on Sectoral Composition:
Delaware vs. Synthetic Control and Bordering States
Note: See text for details on construction of the synthetic control.
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Appendix Figure A.2: Policy Effect on Employment, Unemployment, and Population:
Delaware Relative to the Synthetic Control Allowing the Control to Vary by Outcome
Note: The procedure for constructing the synthetic controls in this figure allows the composition of the control to vary across outcome. See paper
for details.
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Appendix Figure A.3: Policy Effect on Employment, Unemployment, and Population:
Delaware Relative to the Synthetic Control Excluding States Losing Population to Delaware
Note: When constructing the synthetic control in this figure, I do not allow the five states losing the most population to Delaware after the policy to
enter the control. These include Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Rhode Island. See paper for details.
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Appendix Figure A.4: Share of New Residents 55 and Older 
 
 
Note: This plot is based on CPS Microdata and compares the weighted share of residents who migrated 
across states last year who are 55 and older. The data are missing for Delaware from 1968 through 
1976, and there were no new Delaware residents in the CPS from 1977 through 1980, or in 1985 and 
1995. Sample sizes for Delaware are small; from 1981 through 2013 they range from 33 to 99. 
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Appendix Figure A.5: Growth Rates of Number of Individuals Unemployed and Out-of-Labor Force
Note: See paper for details on construction of synthetic control.
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Appendix Table A.1: Policy Effect on Employment, Unemployment, and Population, Delaware vs. Bordering States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total
Employment
Growth
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share
of Employment
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
Pre-1976 -0.001 -0.000 -1.789*** 0.011***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.518) (0.002)
1981-1987 -0.006 0.001*** -0.265 0.004*** 0.027*** 0.032*
(0.006) (0.000) (0.577) (0.001) (0.008) (0.018)
1988-1992 -0.021*** -0.001*** -1.747*** 0.007*** 0.047*** -0.006
(0.007) (0.000) (0.508) (0.002) (0.008) (0.015)
1993-2000 -0.005 -0.001** -2.056*** 0.005*** 0.045*** -0.008
(0.004) (0.000) (0.403) (0.001) (0.007) (0.009)
2001+ -0.022*** -1.275*** 0.004*** 0.047*** 0.012
(0.005) (0.445) (0.001) (0.006) (0.014)
Pre-1976*DE 0.004 0.001 -0.122 0.005*
(0.010) (0.001) (0.941) (0.003)
1981-1987*DE 0.012 0.005*** -1.324 0.003 0.013 0.026
(0.012) (0.001) (0.940) (0.002) (0.011) (0.033)
1988-1992*DE 0.010 0.004*** -1.553** 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.043
(0.013) (0.001) (0.756) (0.003) (0.010) (0.029)
1993-2000*DE 0.007 0.005*** -1.467*** 0.007*** 0.018** 0.028
(0.007) (0.001) (0.491) (0.002) (0.009) (0.021)
2001+*DE -0.001 -1.008 0.007*** -0.000 0.027
(0.009) (0.695) (0.002) (0.009) (0.029)
DE 0.001 -0.000 0.267 0.001 -0.006 -0.031*
(0.007) (0.000) (0.375) (0.001) (0.008) (0.019)
Observations 212 160 176 200 140 156
R-squared 0.241 0.536 0.230 0.359 0.546 0.072
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variables are
measured at the state/year level.  These estimates are from a differences-in-differences regression comparing
Delaware to bordering states: New Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. No data exist for participation and
housing price growth before 1976, and no data exist for FIRE growth (using the SIC industry definition) after
2000.  See paper for details.
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share of
Employment
Total
Employment
Growth
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
1981 0.002 0.001 -1.019 -0.003 0.006 0.005
(5/50) (22/50) (9/50) (36/50) (11/50) (26/50)
[.1] [.44] [.18] [.72] [.22] [.52]
1982 0.004 0.029 -2.84 0.004 0.006 0.033
(2/50) (4/50) (3/50) (10/50) (12/50) (13/50)
[.04] [.08] [.06] [.2] [.24] [.26]
1983 0.005 0.014 -2.486 0.008 0.009 0.084
(1/50) (9/50) (3/50) (7/50) (9/50) (3/50)
[.02] [.18] [.06] [.14] [.18] [.06]
1984 0.004 0.006 -1.631 0.006 0.017 0.057
(2/50) (18/50) (5/50) (9/50) (4/50) (8/50)
[.04] [.36] [.1] [.18] [.08] [.16]
1985 0.006 0.019 -2.2 0.007 0.016 0.07
(1/50) (4/50) (3/50) (8/50) (6/50) (5/50)
[.02] [.08] [.06] [.16] [.12] [.1]
1986 0.008 0.011 -2.897 0.009 0.016 0.07
(1/50) (12/50) (2/50) (8/50) (2/50) (5/50)
[.02] [.24] [.04] [.16] [.04] [.1]
1987 0.01 0.028 -3.023 0.009 0.021 0.076
(1/50) (2/50) (2/50) (9/50) (3/50) (4/50)
[.02] [.04] [.04] [.18] [.06] [.08]
1988 0.006 0.013 -2.668 0.01 0.029 0.056
(1/50) (9/50) (2/50) (5/50) (1/50) (7/50)
[.02] [.18] [.04] [.1] [.02] [.14]
1989 0.004 0.009 -2.301 0.011 0.033 0.072
(2/50) (15/50) (4/50) (3/50) (1/50) (3/50)
[.04] [.3] [.08] [.06] [.02] [.06]
1990 0.004 0.004 -1.86 0.009 0.028 0.035
(1/50) (21/50) (4/50) (5/50) (1/50) (6/50)
[.02] [.42] [.08] [.1] [.02] [.12]
1991 0.004 0.011 -1.773 0.013 0.02 0.03
(1/50) (15/50) (3/50) (3/50) (2/50) (8/50)
[.02] [.3] [.06] [.06] [.04] [.16]
1992 0.002 0.001 -2.517 0.011 0.015 0.019
(4/50) (26/50) (2/50) (3/50) (6/50) (13/50)
[.08] [.52] [.04] [.06] [.12] [.26]
1993 0.008 0.008 -2.214 0.011 0.015 0.02
(1/50) (14/50) (1/50) (4/50) (7/50) (13/50)
[.02] [.28] [.02] [.08] [.14] [.26]
Appendix Table A.2: Policy Effects on Employment, Unemployment, and Population by Year:
Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy, Delaware vs. Synthetic Control
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share of
Employment
Total
Employment
Growth
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
1994 0.01 0.001 -1.75 0.011 0.015 0.003
(1/50) (25/50) (2/50) (3/50) (9/50) (24/50)
[.02] [.5] [.04] [.06] [.18] [.48]
1995 0.006 0.013 -1.527 0.012 0.014 0.011
(1/50) (6/50) (3/50) (3/50) (14/50) (15/50)
[.02] [.12] [.06] [.06] [.28] [.3]
1996 0.006 0.017 -1.519 0.011 0.011 0.017
(1/50) (3/50) (4/50) (2/50) (15/50) (11/50)
[.02] [.06] [.08] [.04] [.3] [.22]
1997 0.008 0.013 -1.446 0.009 0.009 0.017
(1/50) (4/50) (3/50) (3/50) (16/50) (12/50)
[.02] [.08] [.06] [.06] [.32] [.24]
1998 0.002 0.013 -1.263 0.011 0.008 0.024
(5/50) (4/50) (3/50) (3/50) (17/50) (7/50)
[.1] [.08] [.06] [.06] [.34] [.14]
1999 0.002 0.015 -1.225 0.011 0.006 0.032
(5/50) (4/50) (3/50) (4/50) (20/50) (7/50)
[.1] [.08] [.06] [.08] [.4] [.14]
2000 0.004 0.003 -1.098 0.009 0.019 0.04
(2/50) (22/50) (6/50) (3/50) (5/50) (7/50)
[.04] [.44] [.12] [.06] [.1] [.14]
2001 0.01 -1.886 0.009 0.018 0.037
(12/50) (2/50) (4/50) (7/50) (4/50)
[.24] [.04] [.08] [.14] [.08]
2002 0.001 -2.183 0.009 0.011 0.047
(23/50) (1/50) (4/50) (11/50) (6/50)
[.46] [.02] [.08] [.22] [.12]
2003 0.009 -2.253 0.011 0.009 0.052
(10/50) (1/50) (3/50) (13/50) (4/50)
[.2] [.02] [.06] [.26] [.08]
2004 0.017 -2.272 0.012 0.007 0.067
(2/50) (1/50) (3/50) (18/50) (5/50)
[.04] [.02] [.06] [.36] [.1]
2005 0.01 -1.943 0.014 0.006 0.057
(10/50) (2/50) (2/50) (20/50) (2/50)
[.2] [.04] [.04] [.4] [.04]
2006 0.005 -2.114 0.012 0 0.048
(17/50) (2/50) (4/50) (28/50) (6/50)
[.34] [.04] [.08] [.56] [.12]
2007 0 -1.939 0.012 -0.002 0.042
(27/50) (2/50) (3/50) (30/50) (5/50)
[.54] [.04] [.06] [.6] [.1]
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share of
Employment
Total
Employment
Growth
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
2008 0.01 -1.681 0.012 -0.006 0.042
(10/50) (3/50) (2/50) (31/50) (8/50)
[.2] [.06] [.04] [.62] [.16]
2009 0.006 -2.348 0.007 -0.013 0.037
(17/50) (3/50) (5/50) (37/50) (7/50)
[.34] [.06] [.1] [.74] [.14]
2010 0.002 -2.423 0.007 -0.019 0.037
(22/50) (4/50) (6/50) (42/50) (4/50)
[.44] [.08] [.12] [.84] [.08]
2011 0.002 -2.148
(21/50) (6/50)
[.42] [.12]
2012 -0.003 -1.633
(30/50) (6/50)
[.6] [.12]
2013 0.012 -1.325
(7/50) (10/50)
[.14] [.2]
Note: These estimates are from a differences-in-differences specification comparing Delaware to the
synthetic control in each post-policy year, relative to the five years preceding the policy.  The rank of the
effect relative to placebo estimates is in parentheses. P-value based on this rank is in brackets.  See
paper for details.
Total
Employment
Growth
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share of
Employment
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
1981 -0.005 0.002*** -0.167 -0.004 0.005 0.009
(0.010) (0.001) (0.601) (0.004) (0.018) (0.028)
1982 0.018 0.004*** -1.667 0.002 0.007 0.033
(0.012) (0.001) (1.113) (0.002) (0.018) (0.026)
1983 0.012 0.005*** -1.533 0.005* 0.008 0.072***
(0.015) (0.001) (1.477) (0.003) (0.018) (0.025)
1984 0.007 0.003*** -0.867 0.003 0.015 0.017
(0.011) (0.001) (1.339) (0.004) (0.019) (0.038)
1985 0.019* 0.006*** -1.300 0.005 0.016 0.032
(0.011) (0.001) (1.167) (0.005) (0.018) (0.040)
1986 0.010 0.008*** -1.867** 0.005 0.017 0.015
(0.010) (0.001) (0.880) (0.005) (0.018) (0.049)
1987 0.026*** 0.008*** -1.867*** 0.005 0.023 0.005
(0.010) (0.001) (0.706) (0.005) (0.019) (0.039)
1988 0.013 0.006*** -1.667*** 0.006 0.031* 0.022
(0.010) (0.001) (0.601) (0.006) (0.018) (0.027)
1989 0.011 0.003*** -1.333** 0.009* 0.036** 0.070*
(0.009) (0.001) (0.558) (0.005) (0.017) (0.038)
1990 0.007 0.004*** -1.100** 0.006 0.030 0.051
(0.011) (0.001) (0.527) (0.004) (0.019) (0.034)
1991 0.011 0.004*** -1.200** 0.012*** 0.022 0.047
(0.010) (0.001) (0.520) (0.003) (0.020) (0.030)
1992 0.005 0.002*** -2.467*** 0.007*** 0.019 0.023
(0.009) (0.001) (0.744) (0.002) (0.019) (0.024)
1993 0.011 0.007*** -2.167*** 0.007*** 0.021 0.023
(0.008) (0.001) (0.682) (0.002) (0.018) (0.024)
1994 0.002 0.009*** -1.767** 0.007*** 0.024 0.019
(0.009) (0.001) (0.682) (0.002) (0.019) (0.024)
1995 0.014 0.007*** -1.700*** 0.009*** 0.022 0.029
(0.009) (0.001) (0.632) (0.003) (0.019) (0.024)
1996 0.015* 0.006*** -1.467** 0.008*** 0.016 0.030
(0.008) (0.001) (0.613) (0.003) (0.018) (0.024)
1997 0.007 0.008*** -1.433*** 0.007** 0.011 0.031
(0.009) (0.001) (0.491) (0.003) (0.016) (0.024)
1998 0.010 0.002*** -1.267*** 0.008*** 0.012 0.028
(0.009) (0.001) (0.478) (0.003) (0.016) (0.024)
1999 0.007 0.001 -1.133** 0.007** 0.010 0.034
(0.009) (0.001) (0.554) (0.003) (0.015) (0.025)
Appendix Table A.3: Policy Effects on Employment, Unemployment, and Population by Year:
Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy, Delaware vs. Bordering States
Total
Employment
Growth
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share of
Employment
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
2000 -0.007 0.003*** -0.800 0.004* 0.025 0.029
(0.009) (0.001) (0.505) (0.003) (0.015) (0.029)
2001 -0.004 -1.167** 0.006 0.021 0.022
(0.009) (0.515) (0.004) (0.013) (0.026)
2002 -0.010 -1.567** 0.004 0.010 0.016
(0.009) (0.631) (0.003) (0.012) (0.030)
2003 0.001 -1.433** 0.007*** 0.012 0.023
(0.009) (0.655) (0.003) (0.013) (0.028)
2004 0.014 -1.233** 0.009*** 0.009 0.025
(0.009) (0.574) (0.003) (0.012) (0.034)
2005 0.005 -0.800 0.011*** 0.006 0.022
(0.009) (0.541) (0.002) (0.013) (0.038)
2006 0.001 -1.067** 0.011*** -0.000 0.030
(0.009) (0.536) (0.002) (0.014) (0.029)
2007 -0.005 -0.800 0.010*** -0.002 0.041
(0.009) (0.574) (0.002) (0.013) (0.026)
2008 -0.003 -0.400 0.008*** -0.011 0.043
(0.009) (0.608) (0.002) (0.012) (0.031)
2009 -0.014 -0.467 0.002 -0.020 0.040
(0.009) (0.682) (0.002) (0.013) (0.032)
2010 -0.004 -0.933 0.001 -0.026* 0.024
(0.009) (0.701) (0.002) (0.014) (0.025)
2011 -0.000 -1.067 0.009
(0.009) (0.773) (0.025)
2012 -0.006 -1.200 0.026
(0.009) (0.868) (0.025)
2013 0.010 -0.967 0.029
(0.009) (0.673) (0.024)
Observations 212 160 176 200 140 156
R-squared 0.567 0.817 0.736 0.409 0.607 0.832
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  These coefficients are the interactions between the year and
Delaware.  They are from a differences-in-differences specification comparing Delaware to bordering states in
each post-policy year relative to the five years preceding the policy. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
See paper for details.
(1) (2)
1960 0.03*** 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
1970 -0.002** 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
1977-1981 -0.04 -0.003
(0.04) (0.04)
1982 -0.03 -0.002
(0.05) (0.05)
1983 0.01** 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
1984 -0.04 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
1985 -0.003 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
1986 -0.05 -0.06*
(0.05) (0.05)
1987 -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
1988 0.005* -0.0004
(0.05) (0.05)
Control All States Bordering States
N 10,089,651 1,075,720
Appendix Table A.4: Policy Effect on Wages: Yearly Estimates
Note:  This table shows the coefficients on the interaction between Delaware and year
group, relative to all states (column 1) and bordering states (column 2).  These coefficients
are from a regression including an indicator for Delaware, each post-policy year, the year
group 1977-1981, the earlier census years (omitting 1950), and those indicators interacted
with Delaware (omitting the interaction with 1950). I show in this table only the
interactions for the pre-policy years and the first eight post-policy years.  Asterisks denote
whether the difference relative to the coefficient on Delaware*1977-1981 is statistically
significant.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses, as
these are larger than clustered standard errors.  In the regressions including all states, I
control for state characteristics in the pre-policy period, individual characteristics, and
occupation and industry fixed effects.  In the regressions including bordering states, I
control for individual characteristics and occupation and industry fixed effects.  See text of
the paper for further details.
FIRE Trade
Transportation/
Utilties Services Construction Manufacturing Government
1980-1987 0.165** 0.111** -0.004 0.155** 0.181 -0.188*** -0.124
(0.052) (0.048) (0.087) (0.054) (0.105) (0.042) (0.069)
1987-1992 -0.112*** -0.117*** -0.042 -0.046 -0.368*** -0.167** -0.047
(0.014) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.107) (0.052) (0.054)
1992-2000 -0.022 0.022 0.089** 0.082* 0.150** -0.073 -0.040
(0.030) (0.020) (0.029) (0.038) (0.057) (0.045) (0.054)
1980-1987*DE 0.498*** 0.058 0.089 0.026 0.124 0.143*** 0.047
(0.052) (0.048) (0.087) (0.054) (0.105) (0.042) (0.069)
1987-1992*DE 0.206*** 0.101** 0.111** -0.015 0.216* 0.083 -0.019
(0.014) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.107) (0.052) (0.054)
1992-2000*DE 0.342*** 0.111*** 0.070** 0.040 0.159** -0.109** 0.085
(0.030) (0.020) (0.029) (0.038) (0.057) (0.045) (0.054)
DE -0.017* -0.025 -0.056* 0.036 -0.110** 0.024* 0.022
(0.009) (0.014) (0.027) (0.026) (0.042) (0.013) (0.052)
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
R-squared 0.971 0.883 0.510 0.862 0.880 0.771 0.646
Appendix Table A.5: Policy Effect on Employment Growth in FIRE and Other Industries:
     Differences-in-Differences Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  These estimates are from a differences-
in-differences regression comparing Delaware to bordering states: New Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.  The
dependent variables are Ln(Empl_t,s) - Ln(Empl_t',s) for (t,t') = (1976,1980), (1980,1987), (1992,1987), (2000,1992).
The explanatory variables include year fixed effects, and these effects interacted with Delaware.  Coefficients on the
interaction with Delaware represent the additional employment growth in Delaware relative to the control over the
given period relative to this difference in employment growth from 1976 to 1980.  See paper for details.
Appendix Table A.6:  Composition of Synthetic Control by Outcome
FIRE Employment
Growth as a Share
of Employment
Total
Employment
Growth
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing
Price
Growth
Indiana 0.393 0.371 0.356 0.095 0 0.205
Connecticut 0.22 0.174 0.216 0.257 0.198 0.358
Maryland 0.205 0.243 0.167 0.228 0.159 0.214
South Carolina 0.066 0.074 0.063 0.129 0.09 0.065
Arizona 0.041 0.04 0.063 0 0.129 0
Ohio 0.027 0.039 0.056 0.15 0.259 0
Florida 0 0 0.029 0.08 0 0.084
Nevada 0.036 0.033 0.021 0.006 0.003 0.008
Alaska 0.012 0.018 0.017 0.016 0 0.032
Vermont 0 0 0.012 0 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0.02 0
New Hampshire 0 0.009 0 0 0 0
North Carolina 0 0 0 0.039 0.142 0.034
Note: The construction of the synthetic controls in this table allows for the composition of the control to vary
across outcomes.  In particular, the weights on the predictor variables are determined by a regression-based
method, rather than each being assigned a weight of one (as in the principal results).  See paper for details.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Predictors Delaware
Bordering
States
Synthetic Control
for
Unemployment
Rate
Synthetic
Control for
Population
Growth
Synthetic Control
for Employment
Growth
Share Employed in
FIRE
1965-1969 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
1970-1974 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
1975-1979 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing
1965-1969 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34
1970-1974 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30
1975-1979 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27
Trade
1965-1969 0.2 0.2 0.20 0.20 0.20
1970-1974 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
1975-1979 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Services
1965-1969 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14
1970-1974 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
1975-1979 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18
% Metropolitan
1960 68.9 81.5 60.8 63.6 60.9
1970 70.4 83.8 69.2 70.5 69.6
1980 67.0 87.4 77.0 79.6 77.3
% with ≥ a HS Diploma
1960 43.3 39.6 42.0 40.4 41.7
1970 54.6 51.7 53.4 51.4 53.1
1980 68.6 66.5 67.5 66.0 67.4
Unemployment Rate
1970-1974 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.2
1975-1979 8.0 7.5 6.8 6.8 6.7
1980 7.4 7.3 7.7 7.0 7.7
Population Growth
1966-1970 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1976-1980 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
Appendix Table A.7: Pre-policy Characteristics of Delaware, Bordering States, and the Synthetic Control
     Allowing the Synthetic Control to Vary Across Outcomes
Note: This table compares the balance of predictor variables in the synthetic control, Delaware, and the states bordering Delaware.
The procedure for constructing the synthetic controls allows the composition of the control to vary across outcomes, by setting
weights on predictor variables based on a regression-based method. Not all predictors are shown. For the full set of predictors, see
text.
Total
Employment
Growth
FIRE Employment
Growth as a
Share of
Employment
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing Price
Growth
Panel A: Delaware Relative to Synthetic Control
Pre-1976 0.004 0.001 -1.19* 0.007*
(12/50) (6/50) (3/50) (5/50)
[.24] [.12] [.06] [.1]
1981-1987 0.017* 0.006** -2.228** 0.005 0.013* 0.043
(4/50) (1/50) (2/50) (8/50) (5/50) (9/50)
[.08] [.02] [.04] [.16] [.1] [.18]
1988-1992 0.007 0.004** -2.059* 0.011** 0.028** 0.068**
(17/50) (1/50) (3/50) (2/50) (1/50) (2/50)
[.34] [.02] [.06] [.04] [.02] [.04]
1993-2000 0.01 0.006** -1.292* 0.01* 0.017 0.034
(8/50) (1/50) (5/50) (4/50) (6/50) (8/50)
[.16] [.02] [.1] [.08] [.12] [.16]
2001+ 0.006 -2.023** 0.01* 0.005 0.053**
(10/50) (2/50) (3/50) (23/50) (2/50)
[.2] [.04] [.06] [.46] [.04]
Panel B:  Delaware Relative to Bordering States
Pre-1976 0.004 0.001 -0.122 0.005*
(0.010) (0.001) (0.941) (0.003)
1981-1987 0.012 0.005*** -1.324 0.003 0.013 0.026
(0.012) (0.001) (0.940) (0.002) (0.011) (0.033)
1988-1992 0.010 0.004*** -1.553** 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.043
(0.013) (0.001) (0.756) (0.003) (0.010) (0.029)
1993-2000 0.007 0.005*** -1.467*** 0.007*** 0.018** 0.028
(0.007) (0.001) (0.491) (0.002) (0.009) (0.021)
2001+ -0.001 -1.008 0.007*** -0.000 0.027
(0.009) (0.695) (0.002) (0.009) (0.029)
Appendix Table A.8: Policy Effect on Employment, Unemployment, and Population:
Differences-in-Differences Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy, Allowing the Synthetic Control to
     Vary Across Outcomes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both panels present differences-in-differences estimates. In Panel A,
rank of effect relative to placebo estimates in parentheses and p-value based on this rank in brackets.  In
Panel B, robust standard error in parentheses.  The construction of the synthetic control used in Panel A
allows for the composition to vary across outcomes.  In particular, the weights on the predictor variables are
determined by a regression-based method, rather than each being assigned a weight of one (as in the
principal results).  Estimates in Panel B are the coefficients on year group interacted with Delaware.  See
paper for details.
Virginia 0.243
Ohio 0.17
Michigan 0.159
Florida 0.131
South Carolina 0.097
Connecticut 0.078
North Carolina 0.068
Vermont 0.041
Alaska 0.013
Appendix Table A.9: Composition of Synthetic Control:
     Excluding Five States Losing Most Population to Delaware After the Policy
Note: This table presents the composition of the synthetic control when excluding the five states losing
the most population to Delaware after the policy (relative to before the policy).  This composition is the
same across all outcomes, since the weight on the predictor variables is set to one for each variable.
See paper for details.
(1) (2) (3)
Predictors Delaware
Bordering
States Synthetic Control
Share Employed in
FIRE
1965-1969 0.04 0.05 0.04
1970-1974 0.05 0.05 0.05
1975-1979 0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing
1965-1969 0.36 0.32 0.33
1970-1974 0.31 0.28 0.29
1975-1979 0.28 0.24 0.26
Trade
1965-1969 0.2 0.2 0.20
1970-1974 0.21 0.21 0.20
1975-1979 0.22 0.22 0.21
Services
1965-1969 0.13 0.15 0.14
1970-1974 0.15 0.17 0.15
1975-1979 0.17 0.19 0.17
% Metropolitan
1960 68.9 81.5 55.2
1970 70.4 83.8 62.1
1980 67.0 87.4 73.0
% with ≥ a HS Diploma
1960 43.3 39.6 39.4
1970 54.6 51.7 49.8
1980 68.6 66.5 64.5
Unemployment Rate
1970-1974 4.9 4.9 5.2
1975-1979 8.0 7.5 7.1
1980 7.4 7.3 7.3
Population Growth
1966-1970 0.02 0.01 0.01
1976-1980 0 0 0.01
Note: This table compares the balance of predictor variables in the synthetic control, Delaware, and the states bordering Delaware.  The
procedure for constructing the synthetic control did not allow the five states losing the most population to Delaware after the policy (relative to
before) to enter the control. Not all predictors are shown. For the full set of predictors, see text.
Appendix Table A.10: Pre-policy Characteristics of Delaware, Bordering States, and the Synthetic Control
     Excluding from the Synthetic Control the States Losing the Most Population to Delaware After the Policy
Total
Employment
Growth
FIRE Employment
Growth as a
Share of
Employment
Unemployment
Rate
Population
Growth
Labor Force/
Population
Housing Price
Growth
Panel A: Delaware Relative to Synthetic Control
Pre-1976 0.005 0.001 -1.093* 0.01**
(9/45) (5/45) (3/45) (2/45)
[.2] [.111] [.067] [.044]
1981-1987 0.016* 0.006** -2.573** 0.007 0.013 0.059
(3/45) (1/45) (2/45) (5/45) (5/45) (5/45)
[.067] [.022] [.044] [.111] [.111] [.111]
1988-1992 0.01 0.004** -2.562** 0.013** 0.026** 0.047*
(13/45) (1/45) (2/45) (2/45) (1/45) (3/45)
[.289] [.022] [.044] [.044] [.022] [.067]
1993-2000 0.011* 0.006** -1.406* 0.012** 0.015 0.015
(4/45) (1/45) (3/45) (2/45) (10/45) (11/45)
[.089] [.022] [.067] [.044] [.222] [.244]
2001+ 0.01 -2.081** 0.013** -0.002 0.053**
(6/45) (1/45) (2/45) (28/45) (2/45)
[.133] [.022] [.044] [.622] [.044]
Panel B:  Delaware Relative to Bordering States
Pre-1976 0.004 0.001 -0.122 0.005*
(0.010) (0.001) (0.941) (0.003)
1981-1987 0.012 0.005*** -1.324 0.003 0.013 0.026
(0.012) (0.001) (0.940) (0.002) (0.011) (0.033)
1988-1992 0.010 0.004*** -1.553** 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.043
(0.013) (0.001) (0.756) (0.003) (0.010) (0.029)
1993-2000 0.007 0.005*** -1.467*** 0.007*** 0.018** 0.028
(0.007) (0.001) (0.491) (0.002) (0.009) (0.021)
2001+ -0.001 -1.008 0.007*** -0.000 0.027
(0.009) (0.695) (0.002) (0.009) (0.029)
Appendix Table A.11: Policy Effect on Employment, Unemployment, and Population:
Differences-in-Differences Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy, Excluding States Losing Most
     Population to Delaware from Synthetic Control
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both panels present differences-in-differences estimates. In Panel A,
rank of effect relative to placebo estimates in parentheses and p-value based on this rank in brackets.  In
Panel B, robust standard error in parentheses.  The construction of the synthetic control used in Panel A does
not allow the five states losing the most population to Delaware after the policy to enter the control
(Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Rhode Island).  Estimates in Panel B are the
coefficients on year group interacted with Delaware.  See paper for details.
Appendix Table A.12: 1950 Census Bureau Occupational Codes Included as Relevant Managers
200 “Buyers and department heads, store”
201 “Buyers and shippers, farm products”
204 “Credit men”
205 “Floormen and floor managers, store”
210 “Inspectors, public administration”
250 “Officials and administrators (n.e.c.), public administration”
280 “Purchasing agents and buyers (n.e.c.)”
290 “Managers, officials, and proprietors (n.e.c.)”
Unemployment
Growth
Not in Labor
Force Growth
Panel A: Delaware Relative to Synthetic Control
1981-1987 -0.031 0.001
(37/50) (21/50)
[.74] [.42]
1988-1992 0.099 0.014
(6/50) (3/50)
[.12] [.06]
1993-2000 0.066 0.01
(5/50) (8/50)
[.1] [.16]
2001+ 0.035 0.019
(13/50) (2/50)
[.26] [.04]
Panel B:  Delaware Relative to Bordering States
1981-1987 -0.050 -0.006
(0.064) (0.004)
1988-1992 0.026 0.008
(0.101) (0.011)
1993-2000 0.031 0.004
(0.039) (0.006)
2001+ 0.002 0.016***
(0.074) (0.004)
Appendix Table A.13: Policy Effect on Growth in Number Unemployed and out-of-the
Labor Force:
     Differences-in-Differences Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both panels present differences-in-differences
estimates. The dependent variables are at the state/year level.  In Panel A, rank of
effect relative to placebo estimates in parentheses and p-value based on this rank in
brackets.  In Panel B, robust standard error in parentheses.  Estimates in Panel B are
the coefficients on year group interacted with Delaware.  See paper for details.
FIRE Trade Manufacturing
Transportation
and Utilities Services Construction Government
Panel A:  Delaware Relative to Synthetic Control
Pre-1976 0.001 -0.004 0 0 0 0.004 -0.001
(20/50) (33/50) (22/50) (28/50) (29/50) (14/50) (29/50)
[.4] [.66] [.44] [.56] [.58] [.28] [.58]
1981-1987 0.013 -0.013 0.005 -0.004 0 -0.001 0.001
(1/50) (49/50) (13/50) (46/50) (26/50) (27/50) (21/50)
[.02] [.98] [.26] [.92] [.52] [.54] [.42]
1988-1992 0.039 -0.022 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009
(1/50) (49/50) (33/50) (41/50) (28/50) (36/50) (39/50)
[.02] [.98] [.66] [.82] [.56] [.72] [.78]
1993-2000 0.064 -0.018 -0.026 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005
(1/50) (49/50) (47/50) (43/50) (37/50) (40/50) (32/50)
[.02] [.98] [.94] [.86] [.74] [.8] [.64]
Panel B: Delaware Relative to Bordering States
Pre-1976 0.001 0.000 -0.015 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.010
(0.001) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.013)
1981-1987 0.012*** -0.012** 0.011 -0.004* -0.010 -0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.022) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.013)
1988-1992 0.034*** -0.016*** 0.009 -0.003 -0.015** -0.007 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.021) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013)
1993-2000 0.059*** -0.009** -0.014 -0.007*** -0.025*** -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.020) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012)
Share Employed in:
Appendix Table A.14:  Policy Effect on Sectoral Composition
     Differences-in-Differences Estimates Relative to Five Years Pre-Policy
Note: Both panels present differences-in-differences estimates.  The dependent variables are at the state/year
level.  In Panel A, rank of effect relative to placebo estimates in parentheses and p-value based on this rank in
brackets.  In Panel B, robust standard error in parentheses.  Estimates in Panel B are the coefficients on year
group interacted with Delaware.  See paper for details.
